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The Eleventh Commandment:
Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render
the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
RICHARD KLEIN*
INTRODUCTION
As the number of indigents charged with crimes has increased, in part
due to expanded funding for police and prosecutors to fight the national
and local "war on drugs," there has not been a corresponding increase of
funding to provide counsel for indigent defendants. In fact, due to
widespread financial difficulties impacting local and state governments,
the money available for court-appointed counsel and public defenders has
actually declined in many localities.'
Inadequate funding has created a situation wherein overburdened defense
counsel cannot possibly provide competent representation to all of the
clients they are assigned to represent. Counsel who have committed their
skills, energy, and careers to representing indigent defendants cannot be
expected to tolerate circumstances where they are compelled to render the
ineffective assistance of counsel.
This Article examines potential remedies available for counsel who are
confronted by a defense delivery system which fails to provide funding
sufficient to ensure the constitutionally mandated effective assistance of
counsel. It is often only the defense counsel within the criminal justice
setting who are concerned with the government's failure to comply with
the Sixth Amendment. These counsel must therefore take action to rectify
the constitutional deficiencies present in the current system.
Past actions by defense counsel, however, have not led to success by
any means. For example, attempts by private court-appointed counsel to
unite for increased funding and to engage in a strike were thwarted by a
1990 decision of the Supreme Court.2 Moreover, class action suits on
* Professor of Law, Touro College Law Center. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1972.
I. For example, in 1992 the budget for the public defender office in Tennessee was cut by 5.3%, John
B. Arango, Tennessee Indigent Defense System in Crisis, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1992, at 42, and for the
1991-1992 fiscal year, funding for the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy was reduced more than
5%, William R. Jones, Defense of Poor Crisis Needs Funding Help, THE ADVOCATE (Ky. Dep't of Pub.
Advoc.), Apr. 1992, at 3.
2. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
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behalf of defendants denied their Sixth Amendment right to effective
counsel have not accomplished their intended goals,3 and public defender
offices have been intimidated by threats of local governments.' If defense
counsel are to effect meaningful changes, they must use broad-based
litigation strategies aimed at challenging inequities in the system for the
delivery of defense services.
I. THE PRIVATE BAR:
INADEQUATE FUNDING FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL
Whereas the focus of institutional defenders has commonly been on
increasing funding in order to hire more lawyers or provide more services
for lawyers, the private court-appointed counsel who represent indigent
defendants have been outspoken critics of the inadequate compensation
provided to them. Their position is not without support. One recent study
concluded that "[v]irtually no assigned counsel program in the country is
adequately funded. In fact, the funding situation nationally is frequently
and accurately characterized as a crisis."'5
The quality of representation provided by inadequately compensated
appointed counsel suffers in many ways. 6 A prime cause of incompetent
representation is the need of the attorney who is dependent on assigned
counsel work for the mainstay of his practice to compensate for the
inadequate pay per case he receives by handling more cases than he can
properly represent.7
3. See infra part V.A.
4. See infra notes 369-74, 384-87 and accompanying text.
5. Nancy Gist, Assigned Counsel: Is the Representation Effective?, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1989,
at 16, 18.
6. The concepts of poor representation and insufficient reimbursement for counsel go hand in hand.
See, e.g., GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES Guideline 10.1(A) (A.B.A. 1988) [hereinafter APPOINTMENT GUIDELINES] (recogmzing that
adequate compensation of attorneys is indispensable to providing competent assistance). See also the
conclusion of the 1989 report of the A.B.A. Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus that "[t]he
American Bar Association is persuaded that the principal failings of the capital punishment review
process today are the inadequacy and inadequate compensation of counsel at trial "TASK FORCE
ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS, AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES,
reprinted in Ira P Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty
Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1990) (emphasis added) [hereinafter TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY
HABEAS CORPUS]. The Washington Defenders Association's Standards for Public Defense Services
states that inadequate compensation and the resulting low quality of representation have led attorneys
and clients to harbor cynicism toward the criminal justice system, and have undermined the public's
confidence in the judicial process and in the integrity of the fact-finding procedures. STANDARDS FOR
PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES Standard One commentary (Wash. Defenders Ass'n 1989).
7. Economic pressures on well-intentioned, court-appointed counsel to take more cases than is
advisable is a nationwide phenomenon. The American Bar Association's Criminal Justice in Crisis
[Vol. 68:363
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Another major problem that results from low compensation is the
difficulty in attracting qualified attorneys to act as court-appointed
counsel for the indigent! This can be brought home perhaps most vividly
by the notice a judge recently posted at a Kentucky courthouse: "PLEASE
HELP DESPERATE." 9 The judge was searching for a lawyer to accept
court appointment to represent an indigent in a capital case. The maximum
fee permissible under Kentucky law was $1,250, including all preparatory
work and the trial itself."° Indeed, poor pay has led to the perception that
lawyers who accept representation of indigent defendants do so because
they lack better-paying clients. For example, a book written to assist
people in determining how to choose a lawyer cautions clients to ask
reported that a common complaint of court-appointed counsel is that the low level of compensation
forces them "to carry more cases than a lawyer could effectively handle, because if you don't do that,
you go broke. [The inadequate compensation] tends to develop a practice that is not what we would
hope it would be for the indigent criminal defendants." SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A
FREE SOCIETY, AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 41-42 (1988) [hereinafter CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN CRISIS].
8. In some jurisdictions, the lack of lawyers willing to be on a list of counsel accepting
appointments to represent indigent defendants has been so pronounced that trial courts are forced to
assign any available counsel. The Eleventh Circuit described the press accounts of how some lawyers
reacted to such appointments in a rural area of Georgia. Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986). One attorney said the appointment would mean an actual
"loss of money." Id. at 1504. Another said, "I despise it, I'd rather take a whipping. It's worse than
taking a dose of Colomel [a laxative]." Id. at 1522. The Administrator for the Assigned Counsel Plan
for the First Department in New York State recently concluded that because of the low compensation
rates, the most capable and experienced attorneys are no longer willing to take court-appointed cases.
Geoffrey Q. Rails, In Defending the Poor, We Get What We Pay For, THE DEFENDER (N.Y. State
Defenders Ass'n), Mar. 1991, at 3, 3-4. In Washington State, judges have concluded that because of the
low compensation level provided to court-appointed counsel, it is difficult to secure competent attorneys.
STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES Standard One commentary (Wash. Defenders Ass'n 1989).
The quality of attorneys accepting assignments to represent indigent defendants confronting the death
penalty in the South may be particularly poor due to low compensation. For example, as of January,
1990, six of the 26 individuals on death row in Kentucky had counsel who have since been disbarred
or have had their licenses to practice law suspended. Stephanie Saul, When Death is the Penalty;
Attorneys for Poor Defendants Often Lack Experience and Skill, NEWSDAY, Nov. 25, 1991, at 8; see
also Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338, 1341 (Miss. 1990) (noting that by allowing the recovery of
actual expenses of court-appointed counsel, it is to be expected that there will be better participation by
members of the bar).
9. Saul, supra note 8, at 8. The lawyer who finally responded to the judge's plea had no active
practice or experience in death penalty cases, had a reputation for unethical and perhaps illegal conduct,
and may well have been drunk when he appeared in court on this case. The defendant was convicted
and sentenced to die in the electric chair. Id.
10. Many death penalty experts estimate that death penalty case preparation and trial requires 500-
1,000 hours of work. Id. Full-time lawyers for the indigent certainly do not fare any better financially
than court-appointed counsel. The starting salary for a public defender in Louisville, Kentucky, in 1991
was $15,000 a year. Edward C. Monahan, Who is Trying to Kill the Sixth Amendment?, CRIM. JUST.,
Summer 1991, at 24, 27. The salary of the chief public defender in one Kentucky county is barely more
than half that of the county's chief prosecutor. Id. at 52.
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"why any competent attorney with a booming practice has time on his
hands,"" implying that lawyers with enough free time to take on cases
for indigent clients are not competent enough to attract paying clients.
When compensation for indigent representation barely covers overhead,
an experienced attorney with an adequate supply of paying clients is not
likely to seek court-assigned representation of the indigent.' 2 A 1986
study by the Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association found that,
after deducting the average overhead expenses in Oregon, an attorney who
was doing only court-appointed indigent defense work would have a net
annual income of $72.' 3  A 1988 study prepared for the Joint
Subcommittee Studying Alternative Indigent Defense Systems for the
Virginia General Assembly and the Criminal Law Section of the Virginia
State Bar found that after taking into account counsels' overhead costs,
the effective hourly rate that was paid to a survey sample of Virginia
attorneys representing indigents in capital cases at trial was approximately
$13 14
Even those representing defendants in capital cases are plagued by
inadequate compensation. 5  Louisiana allows a maximum total
compensation for court-appointed counsel in death penalty cases of $1,000
per case.16 In Alabama, the maximum fee is $1,000 for out-of-court
capital case preparation. 7 Oklahoma had a $3,200 limit on death penalty
11. DENISE G. SHEKERJIAN, COMPETENT COUNSEL. WORKING WITH LAWYERS 52 (1985).
12. The lack of experienced attorneys willing to be assigned the cases of indigent defendants is an
increasingly severe problem. For example, a recent report of the Virginia Bar Association found that
there was an increasing and "disturbing trend among some attorneys, especially the more experienced
attorneys, not to volunteer to be included on the court-appointed counsel list or, if they are on
the list, to ask to be removed from the list after a number of years of service." SPECIAL COMM. ON
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, VIRGINIA BAR ASS'N, THE DEFENSE OF INDIGENTS IN VIRGINIA: A CONSENSUS
FOR CHANGE, 15 (Oct. 1988) (final report of the Virginia Bar Association Special Committee on
Indigent Defendants) [hereinafter INDIGENT DEFENDANTS]), quoted in REPORT OF THE JOINT
SUBCOMMITTEE STUDYING ALTERNATIVE INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, HOUSE Doc. No. 40, at 5 (Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE
SYSTEMS].
13. Gist, supra note 5, at 19.
14. Id. at 18.
15. The Supreme Court, during the 1991 term, took note of the problem by doubling the amount
that is paid to represent indigent defendants in capital cases pending before the Court. The Court found
that the $2,500 maximum permitted under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(d)(2)
(1964), may "deter otherwise willing and qualified attorneys from offering their services to represent
indigent capital defendants." In re Berger, Il1 S. Ct. 628, 629 (1991). The Court refused, however, to
adopt a case-by-case approach to determine an appropriate fee, holding that such a determination would
be "time consuming" and "imprecise." Id. at 630.
16. Saul, supra note 8, at 8.
17. Id. The report of the Alabama Judicial Study Commission's Task Force on Indigent Defense
Services recommended that the case compensation limit for felonies, including post-conviction actions
[Vol. 68:363
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cases until 1990 when the Oklahoma Supreme Court in State v Lynch'
found the amount to be so paltry as to constitute an unconstitutional
"taking of private property "19 In Wilson v. State,20 a capital murder
case in Mississippi, which, until 1990, had a $1,000 statutory maximum
for compensation in capital cases,2 the defendant's attorneys spent totals
of 779.2 and 562 hours, respectively, representing the defendant.22 The
Mississippi Supreme Court mandated that the reimbursement include, in
addition to the $1,000, a supplement of $25 for each hour worked to cover
the average overhead expenses for an attorney in Mississippi. 23
The effects of the frequently below minimum wage compensation
provided to counsel for the indigent in capital cases can be seen in a
recent report of the ABA Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus,
which enumerated repeated instances of incompetent representation and
concluded that inadequacy of counsel is one of the "principal failings of
the capital punishment review process today "24 The National Legal Aid
and Defender Association similarly concluded that "many indigent capital
defendants are not receiving the assistance of a lawyer sufficiently skilled
in practice to render quality assistance."25
in capital cases, be increased to $3,500. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, REPORT TO THE
CHIEF JUSTICE OF ALABAMA 5 (1989) (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
18. 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990).
19. Id. at 1153. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that counties must pay fees equal to the hourly
rate earned by prosecutors with similar qualifications and reimburse reasonable overhead costs. Id. at
1161.
20. 574 So. 2d 1338 (Miss. 1989).
21. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-15-17 (Supp. 1989).
22. Wilson, 574 So. 2d at 1339.
23. Id. at 1341.
24. Robbins, supra note 6, at 16; see also Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary
and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797,
803-07 (1986). A former law clerk to a United States Supreme Court Justice described his experience
regarding death penalty cases as follows:
Again and again, in cases that I reviewed, potential mitigating evidence was readily
available-medical experts who could testify to mental retardation or other evidence of
diminished capacity; relatives who could help explain how and when this individual had been
brutalized; fellow veterans who could testify about the defendant's combat valor, or about the
haunting, warping effects of the battles they experienced together. Again and again, defense
counsel made little or no effort to reach such witnesses.
Clifford Sloan, Death Row Clerk in the Court of Last Resort; US. Supreme Court and Capital Cases,
THE NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 16, 1987, at 18.
25. STANDARDS FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES 3 (Nat'l Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n 1987). Justice Marshall indicated how inadequately
represented a defendant was who, nevertheless, had not been able to obtain relief at the Supreme Court
level:
Counsel did not inform the jury, during summation or at any other time, that petitioner had no
prior criminal history, had been steadily employed, had an honorable military record, had been
1993]
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A lawyer who does agree to accept court-appointed cases but who
nevertheless feels that he is inadequately compensated may lack the
motivation to spend the many hours required in preparing a case. 26 As
the court in White v Board of Commissioners2" observed: "The
relationship between an attorney's compensation and the quality of his or
her representation cannot be ignored. '28 A 1987 study of courts by the
Rural Justice Center concluded that in rural areas the fee for court-
appointed counsel is often so low that the attorneys cannot even recover
their costs for the representation. 29 The study firmly concluded that
"[t]he fee [in rural areas] is too low to encourage adequate case
preparation. '"30 A report prepared for the Virginia Bar Association found
that 17.5% of the attorneys on the court-appointed counsel list who
responded to a survey indicated that they had not done some work that
would have been beneficial to their clients because of the low fees they
received.3 Attorneys are likely to focus their energies on their paying
clients because of the far greater income produced.32
Trial courts may not only reinforce appointed counsel's inclination to
do a minimal amount of work per case, but at times may feel compelled
to explicitly remind counsel that, due to the overwhelming need and the
a regular churchgoer, and had cooperated with the police. Counsel did not give the jury a
single reason why it should spare petitioner's life. The net result was that petitioner was
without an advocate at the sentencing phase.
Messer v. Kemp, 474 U.S. 1088, 1090 (1986) (citation ommitted) (Marshall, J., dissenting). It is widely
acknowledged that special skills are required for counsel in death penalty cases. See APPOINTMENT
GUIDELINES, supra note 6, Guideline 5. 1; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 5-1.2(d) (A.B.A.
1990) (noting the "unique and time-consuming demands" of counsel in capital cases), reprinted in 49
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2013, 2021 (Apr. 10, 1991).
26. I am convinced this is the case, notwithstanding the Alabama Criminal Appeal Court's
declaration that there is no need to adequately compensate court-appointed attorneys because "[a] lawyer
needs no motivation beyond his sense of duty and his pride." Grayson v. State, 479 So. 2d 69, 73 (Ala.
Cnm. App. 1984) (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441, 444 (NJ. 1966)), affid,
479 So. 2d 76 (Ala. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985).
27. 537 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1989).
28. Id. at 1380.
29. Mark Curmden, Indigent Defense in the South: Beggingfor Justice, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 64,
67.
30. Id.
31. ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS, supra note 12, at 5 (quoting INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note 12,
at 23); see also Robert C. Boruchowitz, Funding Crisis Threatens Right to Counsel, WASH. STATE BAR
NFWS, Jan. 1987, at 15 (noting that court-appointed counsel in Washington State are underpaid and have
inadequate support staff, which threatens their ability to provide effective legal assistance).
32. Counsel preference for devoting time to cases for paying clients is encouraged by decisions such
as that of the Arkansas Supreme Court, which stated that counsel on court-appointed cases need not be
paid "fees based on their customary hourly charges or fixed fees for services in criminal cases of this
nature." Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770, 776 (Ark. 1991).
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limited number of counsel for the indigent, large amounts of time should
not be spent on any one case. For example, one court in Nebraska
instructed the court-appointed attorneys in a first-degree murder case that
they were to be "efficient in their representation due to the sparse
population and tax base of the county ""
An evaluation of the assigned counsel program in Massachusetts found
that due to inadequate compensation, 36% of the attorneys failed to
perform vital and basic tasks such as interviewing witnesses, investigating
the facts, and filing appropriate pre-trial motions.3 4 As the Florida
Supreme Court noted, the adage "you get what you pay for" does indeed
apply to legal representation in our society.35
Appellate courts have frequently noted outrageous conduct by court-
appointed attorneys who viewed their work as inadequately compensated.
For example, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that one attorney
did not file an appeal because of financial considerations after his client
was convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to death. 6 In another
33. In re Rehm, 410 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Neb. 1987).
34. See NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, STATEWIDE EVALUATION OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAR ADVOCATE PROGRAM 12-13 (Feb. 28, 1986) (copy on file with the Indiana law
Journal). Similarly, in New York State, the Public Defense Backup Center, analyzing the assigned
counsel program in an upstate New York county, concluded that there was little investigative activity
by defense lawyers; in 86% of the cases there was no attempt to contact any witness, and in over one-
half of the cases there was less than one hour of out-of-court time spent on case preparation. NEW YORK
STATE DEFENDERS ASS'N, PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES IN ONTARIO COUNTY: A STUDY OF THE
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEM 41 (Aug. 1985); see also NEW YORK STATE DEFENDERS ASS'N, PUBLIC
DEFENSE SERVICES IN SCHENECTADY COUNTY: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ASSIGNED COUNSEL PROGRAM
108 (Mar. 1984) (reporting that assigned counsel conducted few investigations, filed few motions, did
little sentencing advocacy "or other indicia of a vigorous and competent defense"); NEW YORK STATE
DEFENDERS ASS'N, PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES IN CLINTON COUNTY: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
ASSIGNED COUNSEL PROGRAM 44 (Jan. 1986) (finding that in only 3% of the cases did the lawyer visit
the scene of the crime, in over half the cases no legal research was conducted, few discovery motions
were made, and little investigative work was done); Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal
Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 581, 900-01 (1986-87)
(noting that court-appointed attorneys engaged in little if any pre-trial preparation and lacked funds for
full-time investigators).
35. Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1114 (Fla. 1986) (quoting MacKenzie v.
Hillsborough County, 288 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1973) (Ervin, J., dissenting)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043
(1987). The court added that the quality of representation provided is inextricably linked to the
compensation received. Id. One commentator has gone as far as claiming that financial realities "make
it more profitable for an attorney to 'lose' quickly than to pursue every conceivable remedy for his
client." Louis M. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and
Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 437 (1980).
36. In re Dale, 247 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978). State statutes commonly provide for
maximum payment for counsel in a homicide case regardless of the number of hours the attorney works
on his client's case. But see In re Armani, 371 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Hamilton County Ct. 1975) (holding that
maximum fee for homicide case was unconscionable); Makemson, 491 So. 2d 1109 (holding that $2,000
maximum for homicide cases was arbitrary, capricious, and should be disregarded).
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case, the West Virginia Supreme Court concluded that a court-appointed
attorney did not seek a justified mistrial because he knew he would
receive inadequate remuneration if the case were retried.
There are two major types of systems for the appointment of private
counsel to represent indigent defendants.3 8 The first is a coordinated
assigned counsel system wherein a full- or part-time administrator assigns
an attorney to each case, approves and controls payment to the counsel,
and, depending on the size of the program, may provide training or
investigative services. The administrator may also design standards that
must be met before an attorney can be placed on the list of attorneys
qualified for court appointment. The second is an ad hoc assigned counsel
system where the court maintains a list of private attorneys who have
volunteered to be assigned to the cases of indigent defendants, and
counsel are assigned by a judge or court clerk on a rotational basis.39
In both systems, it is commonly the trial judge who must sign the final
authorization for payment for the counsel's services, even though this is
in clear violation of the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice.4"
Standard 5-2.4 states, "[w]here the discretion to approve payment claims
is vested in the judiciary, the necessary independence of counsel is
compromised. Defense lawyers ought not be placed in the position where
the amount of their compensation may be influenced by the degree to
which the court is pleased with the representation. '41 Under such a
system, since the defendant's satisfaction with the representation provided
is not sought out in any way, the lawyer knows whom he must please to
receive both payment and future work. It is not uncommon for counsel to
have to beg a reluctant court for full reimbursement. For example, a trial
judge in Nebraska persisted in awarding the attorney in a murder trial
only 20% of what was requested, finding that since police reports were
available, the time spent on investigation and depositions was
unwarranted.42
37. State v. Pelfrey, 256 S.E.2d 438 (W. Va. 1979).
38. Private counsel often have opposed instituting full-time defense counsel in a legal aid or public
defender format. At times, this opposition has been based on the belief that the creation of a full-time
public defender would cut into the business of private lawyers.
39. Counsel are often assigned to meet the needs of the court rather than the needs of the
defendants. See, e.g., McConville & Mirsky, supra note 34, at 901 (noting that judges and court clerks
assigned cases to those counsel who would take a case at a moment's notice, and routinely assigned to
one counsel the cases of co-defendants despite potential conflicts of interest).
40. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 5-2.4 (A.B.A. 1990).
41. Id.
42. State v. Ryan, 444 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Neb. 1989). The Nebraska Supreme Court subsequently
sharply criticized the trial judge:
[Vol. 68:363
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Payment for private, court-appointed counsel typically is based on an
hourly scale which may differ for hours that counsel spends in court and
those spent out of court.43 At the federal level, the Criminal Justice Act
(CJA) provides for court-appointed counsel fees." A 1990 panel
appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that compensation should
no longer be based on any perception that such work ought to be done on
a pro bono basis and called on Congress to enact a fee schedule for CJA
attorneys which would cover reasonable overhead and a reasonable hourly
wage.45
States vary widely in setting fees. For example, in Colorado in 1991, the
hourly rate for court-appointed attorneys for a non-capital felony case was
raised from $25-45 per hour to $45-50 per hour,46 and in 1989 the hourly
rate in California was raised to a maximum of $75 per hour.47
Additionally, states usually set a maximum compensation total per case,
regardless of the number of hours the attorney has worked.4' As state
For this court to approve [only] the amount awarded to applicant by the trial court would be
to send a message that the sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 11 of the
Nebraska Constitution have no real meaning It is not appropnate to subject attorneys,
appointed or otherwise, to the treatment seen in the fee hearing in this case. In such hearings,
it is not appropriate to require appointed attorneys to submit income tax records to the court,
as was done in this case, nor to submit such things as the attorney's notes made in preparation
for final argument
Id.
43. In the vast majority of states, the legislature determines the level of compensation of court-
appointed attorneys. In Iowa, however, the legislature granted judges the authority to control the county
expenditures for counsel. The courts shared the legislature's concerns for holding fees to a minimum,
and the Iowa Supreme Court, noting that the number of criminal cases in the state had increased 600%
between 1956 and 1980, ruled that courts must be sensitive to legitimate budgetary concerns of county
officials and that there is a duty to allow fees only for "necessary services." Hulse v. Wilfvat, 306
N.W.2d 707, 713 (Iowa 1981).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3006 (1988).
45. FEDERAL CouRTs STUDY COMMITrEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTs STUDY COMMITTEE
159 (1990).
46. Spangenberg Group, Non-Capital Felonies, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1990, at 45, 45 (table
prepared for the A.B.A. Bar Info. Prog.), reprinted in THE DEFENDER (N.Y. State Defenders Ass'n),
Mar. 1991, at 26, 26. Some courts have held that there is no need to compensate lawyers at all for
representation of the criminal defendant. In Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982),
the court found that it was not unconstitutional to require such representation without paying the
counsel. But see DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 443 (Alaska 1987) (reversing earlier
holdings and finding that a lawyer who is assigned a criminal case must receive such compensation as
that "received by the average competent attorney operating in the open market"); State ex rel. Wolff v.
Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64, 67-68 (Mo. 1981) (stating that a lawyer has a "right to earn a livelihood for
himself and his family and to be free from involuntary servitude"); Kovarik v. County of Banner, 224
N.W.2d 761,765 (Neb. 1975) (stating that lawyers who are appointed to represent indigents are entitled
to reasonable compensation).
47. Edward C. Monahan, Attorneys Must be Paid Fairly, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1990, at 16, 43,
reprinted in THE DEFENDER (N.Y. State Defenders Ass'n), Mar. 1991, at 13, 24.
48. Arkansas, for example, had a statutory maximum of $350 for noncapital felony cases.
Spangenberg Group, supra note 46, at 26. Georgia provides for maximum compensation of $250 when
1993]
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budgetary problems and greater antagonism toward those charged with
crimes have heightened, some states have actually decreased permitted
maximums. 49 In Kansas, for example, there was a 12% cut imposed on
billed expenses and fees in appointed-attorney criminal cases.5"
Courts, however, have not always taken kindly to state-imposed
maximums. 51 New Hampshire had set a $500 maximum fee for
misdemeanor cases which "shall not be exceeded."5 2 The New Hampshire
Supreme Court found, however, that the rule might result in unfairness
and amended the rule to read that the maximum can be exceeded "for
good cause shown in exceptional circumstances." 3 Lest it appear,
however, that as a result of the court's holding the defense of the indigent
might subsequently be considered by some as warranting compensation
equal to that of a typical paying client, the court made it clear that such
was not the case. 4 Compensation for those who choose to represent the
a client pleads guilty and $350 if the attorney goes to trial in a noncapital felony case. Tnsha Renaud
& Ann Woolner, Meet 'Em and Plead 'Em, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Oct. 8, 1990, at I, 2.
49. Lawyers in civil litigation are not subject to the whims and moods of the legislatures. The
United States Supreme Court in Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984), ruled that the standard for
determining attorney's fees for the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is "the prevailing market
rates in the relevant community." Id. at 895. The Legal Aid Society in that case was awarded fees of
$95-$105 per hour. Id. at 901.
50. Monahan, supra note 47, at 21.
51. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has determined that the courts have "exclusive authority"
to determine the compensation level for court-appointed counsel. Smith v. State, 394 A.2d 834, 838
(N.H. 1978). The court added that "[w]ithout proper court control of court-appointed counsel, and indeed
without adequate compensation for those attorneys, it might be impossible to obtain valid criminal
convictions in future prosecutions of indigent defendants." Id. at 839. Some courts, however, have
concluded that the issue of the adequacy of compensation for court-appointed counsel for the indigent
is not for the courts to decide, but rather is properly within the province of the legislature. See, e.g.,
State v. Ruiz, 602 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Ark. 1980). In some instances, the courts may acknowledge that
the power to set fees is the legislature's, and then proceed to pressure the legislators to act
"appropriately." In State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314 (W. Va. 1976), the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that the compensation for court-appointed counsel was inadequate
and that "the appropriate remedy is to order only that the lawyers of this state may no longer be required
to accept appointments as in the past." Id. at 323. The court delayed entry of its order for one year to
give the legislature time to "take the necessary action to modify or replace the present system of
appointing attorneys to represent indigents." Id., see also Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Ky.
1972) (noting that a system providing no compensation for court-appointed counsel cannot be continued
since it was in violation of both the Commonwealth and U.S. Constitutions); State v. Rush, 217 A.2d
441,449 (N.J. 1966) (noting that the Supreme Court of New Jersey delayed for ten months its order that
court-appointed counsel must receive compensation and could no longer be unpaid so that the legislature
could determine whether it wanted to institute a public defender system or design a new program for
assigned counsel). But see Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528 (Ala. 1979) (rejecting the claim that
underpayment of court-appointed attorneys in Alabama violated the constitutional guarantee to counsel).
52. State v. Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214, 1215 (N.H. 1983).
53. Id. at 1216.
54. Id. Courts have not been unimaginative in formulating the value of work done for the indigent
compared to work done for paying clients. For example, the Florida Supreme Court determined that
assigned counsel in juvenile disciplinary proceedings should receive compensation in the amount of 60%
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indigent,5 the court commented, must take into account "the ethical
obligation of a lawyer to make legal representation available. 56
In Makemson v Martin County,57 the counsel who was appointed on
a capital case in Florida devoted 250 hours to the client's defense. The
maximum fee permitted in Florida. was $3,500, which would have
compensated counsel at a rate of $14 an hour.58 Although the Florida
Supreme Court held the statute specifying the ceiling fee constitutional,
it found that in this instance, and other "extraordinary and unusual
capital" cases, the maximum fee would be unconstitutional when applied
in a manner which could interfere with effective representation. 59 Three
years later, the Florida court expanded the ruling by finding that virtually
every capital case would fall within the "extraordinary and unusual"
criteria.60
In 1991, the Arkansas Supreme Court in Arnold v Kemp 6' concluded
that the state had "perpetuated, throughout the years, a system of
appointment without just compensation. '62 The court then proceeded to
declare the $1,000 maximum attorney fee allowed for a death penalty case
unconstitutional.6 3 In Kentucky, the maximum reimbursement permitted
for appointed counsel remains at $1,250-regardless of the type of case,
unless the court finds that "special circumstances warrant a higher fee. 64
of the fee that a client of ordinary means would pay a modestly successful counsellor. In re D.B., 385
So. 2d 83, 92 (Fla. 1980); see also State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 849 (Kan. 1987)
(finding that the formula to be used in determining compensation is "such sums as will fairly
compensate the attorney, not at the top rate an attorney might charge, but at a rate which is not
confiscatory, considering overhead and expenses'); In re Armani, 371 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975)
(noting that compensation provided to appointed counsel need not equal that paid to private counsel).
55. The Eighth Circuit has held that it is constitutional to compel lawyers, even those who have not
expressed any interest in criminal cases, to represent indigent defendants without any compensation.
Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982).
56. Robinson, 465 A.2d at 1216; see also Dames v. Markoff, 555 P.2d 490, 492-93 (Nev. 1976)
(holding that attorneys are ethically bound to provide representation to indigent defendants for the
statutory fee, limited though it may be).
57. 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986).
58. Id. at 1112.
59. Id. at 1115.
60. White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1380 (Fla. 1989). In Jewell v. Maynard,
383 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989), the West Virginia Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the
statute providing for compensation of $25 per in-court and $20 per out-of-court work hour, with a
ceiling of $1,000 for any one case. The court, emphasizing the relationship between inadequate
remuneration and ineffective assistance of counsel, ruled that compensation in the future was to be $60
and $45 per hour. Id. at 547.
61. 813 S.W.2d 770 (Ark. 1991).
62. Id. at 774.
63. Id. at 775.
64. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31.170(4) (Michie 1985). The statute also provides that compensation
is to be no higher than $35 per hour for time spent in court and $25 per hour for time spent out of
court. Id. These 1992 rates were barely higher than the 1972 rates of $30 and $20, even though the
1993]
1NDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1991 concluded in Lavit v Brady6
that a capital murder case is ipso facto a special circumstance, and thus
warrants additional compensation. 6
Setting maximum limits does not encourage the lawyer to do everything
required to properly represent the indigent client. 67 It would be a rare
individual who continues to work on a case knowing there will be no
additional compensation because he has already worked the number of
hours provided for by the maximum fee payable per case.68 Setting
statutory ceilings also seems to violate Standard 5-2.4 of the ABA's
Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, which states
that "[a]ssigned counsel shall be compensated for time and service
performed."69
Setting maximum fees in many situations may cause a conflict of
interest between the attorney and his client. Once counsel has spent the
number of hours on a case that warrants the maximum compensation, it
will be to the attorney's financial detriment to continue to vigorously
represent the client's best interest. The attorney may choose to act in his
own interest and spend the additional time on either paying clients or
other court-appointed cases. 70 At this point, of course, it is in the
attorney's financial interest for the defendant to plead guilty so that the
counsel's work will no longer be required.' In fact, some lawyers will
accept a court-appointed case only if it is apparent that the defendant will
plead guilty 72
Consumer Price Index increased 213% between the years 1972 and 1990. Ed Monahan, Catching Up
With Current Realities, THE ADVOCATE (Ky. Dep't of Pub. Advoc.), Dec. 1991, at 7, 9.
65. No. 89-CA-2360-MR (Ky. Ct. App. 1991), printed in THE ADVOCATE (Ky. Dep't of Pub.
Advoc.), Dec. 1991, at 3.
66. Id.
67. TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 6, at 22 (reporting that
maximum fee limits are counterproductive to vigorous representation).
68. Such rare individuals, those idealistic counsel committed to representation of the indigent
regardless of the financial sacrifice, do exist. For example, one New York attorney devoted over 400
hours to the successful defense of an indigent defendant accused of murder, yet the county proposed to
pay him only the $2,400 maximum permitted by state law-a rate of $6 an hour. Editorial, Need for
Uniformity, THE TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Aug. 14, 1990, at A6, reprinted in Marty Rosenbaum,
Two Classes of Justice: The Need for Assigned Counsel Reform, THE DEFENDER (N.Y. State Defenders
Ass'n), Mar. 1991, at 5, 6.
69. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 5-2.4 (A.B.A. 1990).
70. If counsel is inadequately compensated, he is unlikely to spend the necessary time required for
appropriate representation: "In such situations, the temptation is too great for a lawyer to shortchange
the client " APPOINTMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 79.
71. See Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338, 1342 (Miss. 1990) (Robertson, J., concurring) (noting
that a statutory cap on reimbursement significantly inhibits the.provision of effective assistance of
counsel).
72. See Rosenbaum, supra note 68, at 7.
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It is understandable that court-appointed counsel might not share a
legislature's view that it is appropriate for the attorney to sacrifice his
own financial well-being so that the state may satisfy the constitutional
mandate of counsel.73 Courts have at times supported lawyers in their
criticisms of legislatures. The Alaska Supreme Court, for example, while
holding that counsel is entitled to reasonable and appropriate
compensation, commented that "requiring an attorney to represent an
indigent criminal defendant for only nominal compensation unfairly
burdens the attorney by disproportionately placing the cost of a program
intended to benefit the public upon the attorney rather than upon the
citizenry as a whole."7 4 Similarly, in 1991, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas declared the public defense system counsel reimbursemerit
schedule unconstitutional because the participating attorneys were required
to "financially subsidize the State's responsibility of indigent
representation."" The Nebraska Supreme Court was also sypmpathetic
to under-compensated attorneys; it not only ruled that defense counsel in
a murder case were entitled to four times the compensation which the trial
judge had authorized, but also proceeded to chastise the lower court judge:
"Defense attorneys perform an absolutely essential function under our
Constitutions and must be treated as honorable persons performing a
necessary legal duty "76
II. THE RESPONSE OF COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL
IN WASHINGTON, D C.
The problem of inadequate funding for court-appointed counsel in
Washington, D.C., led in 1983 to a concerted action by attorneys
desperately seeking to improve conditions. The legality of the "strike" by
73. The vital necessity for adequate compensation for court-appointed counsel in death penalty cases
was forcefully stated by the report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Death Penalty
Habeas Corpus: "Competent and adequately compensated counsel from trial through collateral review
is thus the sine qua non of a just, effective and efficient death penalty system." TASK FORCE ON DEATH
PENALTY HABEAS CoRPUS, supra note 6, at 17.
74. DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437,443 (Alaska 1986); see also State v. Robinson,
465 A.2d 1214, 1217 (N.H. 1983) (noting that the legislature has no right to thrust the expense of
representing the indigent on those citizens who happen to be attorneys).
75. Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Ark. 1991). The court found that the services of an
attorney are property subject to the protection of the Fifth Amendment, and that the fee structure
therefore constituted an unconstitutional taking of property. Id.
76. State v. Ryan, 444 N.W.2d 656, 662 (Neb. 1989). The court ruled that the two court-appointed
attorneys were entitled to compensation at the rate of $50 an hour. Id. at 660.
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the court-appointed attorneys was not resolved until 1990 when the
Supreme Court decided FTC v Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Association.7
Compensation for court-appointed counsel in the District of Columbia
in 1983 had not been increased from the level first instituted by Congress
in 1970: $30 per hour for in-court time and $20 per hour for out-of-court
work.78 In contrast, the Consumer Price Index had increased 140% since
1970. 79 By 1975, the amounts were widely viewed as being too low; a
joint report of the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit
and the District of Columbia Bar concluded that court-appointed counsel
were inadequately compensated and that the low rates inhibited the
District's ability to attract new lawyers and diminished the willingness of
experienced attorneys to represent indigent defendants.8 0 The report
recommended increasing the fees to at least $40 per hour for both in-court
and out-of-court work, doubling the maximum permitted8 ' for
misdemeanors to $800, and increasing the felony maximum from $1,000
to $1,600.2 The report did not lead to any increases in fees.
In 1982, a report by the Court System Study Committee of the District
of Columbia Bar recommended an increase in rates to at least the level
recommended in the 1975 report.8 3 The Bar Association itself passed a
resolution supporting the Committee's recommendations, and a bill was
introduced in the District of Columbia City Council to increase the rate
77. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3006(d)(1) (1970) (amended 1984). The District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act
(DCCJA), enacted in 1974, established a Joint Committee on Judicial Admimstration of the District of
Columbia courts which had authority to set maximum rates for compensating court-appointed counsel.
D.C. CODE ANN. § I 1-2604(a) (Michie 1989). Judges had the discretion to provide less than the amount
requested by DCCJA counsel. Id. § 11-2604(d); see also Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Association at 4, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (Nos. 88-1198,
88-1393) [hereinafter Respondent/Cross-Petitioner's Brief].
79. Respondent/Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 4, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass', 493 U.S. 411
(Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393).
80. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. 510,530-31 (1986). The report concluded that
the low compensation resulted in "reduced services" and that "a system which is heavily weighed
against the indigent defendant in terms of compensation that his attorney will receive raises serious
questions of equal protection." Respondent/Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 5, Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393).
81. Respondent/Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 5, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411
(Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393). The amount of time involved preparing a criminal case had significantly
increased in the years 1970-1983 as procedural and evidentiary rules created significant rights and
grounds for motions on behalf of the accused. The time required for investigation and research
correspondingly increased. Id. at 4.
82. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. at 531.
83. Respondent/Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 5, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass', 493 U.S. 411
(Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393).
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to $50 per hour.84 The bill, however, died in committee and the fee
structure remained.8 5
In 1982, there were 1,200 lawyers on the District of Columbia Criminal
Justice Act 86 (DCCJA) list of attorneys available to receive a court
appointment to represent indigent defendants.8 7 In reality, however, there
were 100 DCCJA "regulars" whose court-appointed cases constituted the
greatest percentage of their practice. 88 These regulars formed the core of
the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (SCTLA). Due to the low
fee structure, these lawyers typically worked out of their own homes, did
their own typing, and had to undertake a high caseload to the detriment
of proper preparation and investigation. 9
The lawyers most active in the SCTLA formed a professional judgment
that their low level of compensation was increasingly responsible for the
inadequate representation that they were compelled to provide. 9 They
sought unsuccessfully to gain support from the chief judge of the superior
court.9 They lobbied the mayor's office for support, and were told that
no one in city government opposed their requests.92
84. Brief for Amicus Curiae National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of
Respondent/Cross Petitioner at 8 n.13, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (Nos. 88-
1198, 88-1393).
85. Id.
86. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-2601 to -2609. The District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act was
modeled after the federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (CJA), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988), which was
designed to provide a payment system for defense services provided to indigent defendants in the federal
courts. The 1970 Amendments to the CJA, Pub. L. 91-447, 84 Stat. 916 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A), authorized the establishment of federal public and community defender organizations in
localities where there were 200 or more appointments of counsel annually. In the period from 1964 to
1992, the number of appointments under the CJA grew from 16,000 to 80,000. Criminal Justice Act
Review Committee: Interim Report, 51 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 2338 (Aug. 19, 1992).
87. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. 510, 522 (1986).
88. Id. at 518. For example, the President of the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association derived
90% of his practice from DCCJA cases, and 99% of the Vice President's work consisted of DCCJA
assignments. Id.
89. Id. at 532-33.
90. The SCTLA leaders claimed that fighting for increased levels of compensation was the single
most important thing they could do to improve the quality of representation. See Respondent/Cross-
Petitioner's Brief at 6, Superior Court TrialLawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393). One
of the leaders of the strike stated that, "[t]he issue was a decreased caseload, not a pay raise per se. The
pay raise was the mechanism through which the decreased caseload would be accomplished." Brief for
the Individual Respondents at 8, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (Nos. 88-1198, 88-
1393).
91. Amicus Cunae's Brief at 8 n.13, Superior Court Trial LawyersAss'n, 493 U.S. 411 (Nos. 88-
1198, 88-1393). The leaders of the SCTLA had been meeting monthly with Chief Judge Moultrie, and
although Moultrie stated privately he believed an increase was deserved, he told the lawyers that they
would have to generate political support for any increase because it was a political, not a judicial
problem. Respondent/Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 7, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass 'n, 493 U.S. 411
(Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393).
92. See Respondent/Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 6, Superior Court Trial Lawyer Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411
(Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393).
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In early 1983, in response in part to the lobbying efforts of the SCTLA
attorneys, a bill was introduced in the District of Columbia City Council
to increase the hourly rates to $35 -per hour for both in-court and out-of-
court time.93 At the hearings held in consideration of the bill, many
court-appointed "regulars" testified, as did leaders of the Public Defender
Service.9 4 The District of Columbia Bar Association, which only once
before had taken a position on the merits of pending legislation, supported
the bill because of its "importance to the Bar, as well as to the public."'95
Not one witness spoke in opposition to the bill on its merits.96 However,
no funds were appropriated to increase compensation for court-appointed
counsel.
The SCTLA decided that concerted and dramatic action was required to
bring attention to the public and the legislators about the dire conditions
under which the lawyers were working. The vast majority of the
"regulars" signed the following statement: "We the undersigned private
criminal lawyers in D.C. Superior Court agree that unless we are granted
a substantial increase in our hourly rate, we will cease accepting new
appointments under the Criminal Justice Act.19 7 The SCTLA's goal was
not to raise the yearly maximum payment of $42,000 that lawyers for
court-appointed cases could receive; that ceiling was not an issue in the
strike.98 The lawyers wanted to be able to take fewer cases and provide
more thorough, competent representation.
This was not, therefore, the classic strike situation. Although the
lawyers were refusing to accept additional cases, they continued to handle
those already accepted. 99 Thus, the lawyers did not completely stop
work. One of the lawyers involved stated that the message of the
"strike"'0 0 was that:
93. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Says Strike By Lawyers Violated Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
23, 1990, at DI.
94. Respondent/Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 8, Superior Court Trial Lawyer's Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411
(Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393).
95. Id.
96. Id. Indeed, a New York Times story written at the time concluded that almost no one at all
disagreed with the lawyers' case for an increase in fees. Leslie M. Werner, Lawyers for the Poor Enter
a Poverty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1983, at B10.
97. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. 510, 511 (1986).
98. Individual Respondent's Brief at 3, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass', 493 U.S. 411 (Nos.
88-i 198, 88-1393). In the year following the strike, the Joint Council on Judicial Administration raised
the ceiling to $50,000. Respondent/Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 6, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n,
493 U.S. 411 (Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393).
99. Respondent/Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 11, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411
(Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393).
100. The terms "strike" and "boycott" were used interchangeably to describe the lawyers' action. Id.
at 2 n.1. Previously, the U.S. Supreme Court defined boycott: "The generic concept of boycott refers
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[T]he system had sold our clients out by saying that we don't
really care what kind of job you do.
So what we said essentially is, we will no longer be a party to the
system's desire to only have a warm body beside you. And that, in fact,
we cannot in good conscience continue to take cases under the present
circumstances.' 0 1
Since the court-appointed lawyers handled 85% of all the cases involving
indigent defendants in the District of Columbia,0 2 any action taken by
them would have significant impact.
Responding to the SCTLA lawyers' statement of intent to strike, the
mayor of the District of Columbia stated openly that he supported the
legislation for increased compensation, that an increase was long overdue,
and that the court-appointed lawyers were working at extraordinarily low
rates.' 3 The SCTLA sought and achieved favorable news coverage of
the strike10 4 and the chief.judge of the superior court finally and
publicly supported an increase in the rate of compensation.)1
The strike was over in two weeks. The District of Columbia City
Council unanimously approved the bill increasing the hourly fees to $55
for in-court time and $45 for out-of-court time.0 6 The Mayor promptly
signed the legislation.'0 7 Almost immediately the number of attorneys
to a method of pressuring a party with whom one has a dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to
withhold, patronage or services from the target." St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry, 438
U.S. 531, 541 (1978).
101. Respondent/Cross-Petitioner's Bnef at II n.3, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S.
411 (Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393) (citation omitted).
102. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. at 522-23. By statute, the Public Defender
Service can represent only those chargedl with crimes punishable by a prison sentence of six months or
more, and can represent no more than 60% of such individuals. Id. at 563. Eighty-five percent of
criminal defendants in the District of Columbia financially qualify for court-appointed counsel. Id. at
521.
103. Respondent/Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 12, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411
(Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393).
104. Id. "The strike was covered [in articles appearing] in The New York Times, USA Today, and The
Economist." Id. at 13. The Washington Post published an editorial favorable to the SCTLA. Conspiracy
in the Lawyer's Lounge?, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1983, at AI2.
105. One week after the strike began, the chief judge said he was "totally supportive" of giving the
court-appointed counsel a raise, although he strongly opposed the strike. Ed Bruske, Moultrie Backs
Raises, Decries Lawyers'Strike, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1983, at C4. Other judges had been supportive
all along. One judge, for example, commented from the bench a week before the strike began that he
backed the lawyers because during the same thirteen year period wherein the salary for the attorneys
had not increased at all, the salaries of the judges went from S30,000 per year to $68,000. Al Kamen
& Ed Bruske, Lawyers, WASH. PosT, Aug. 29, 1983, at B2.
106. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd in part,
493 U.S. 411 (1990).
107. Respondent/Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 18, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411
(Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393). The Mayor stated in a press release that he signed the bill because "I believe
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volunteering to take court-appointed cases substantially increased, while
the caseloads of the "regulars" correspondingly decreased.' A series
of meetings occurred between the SCTLA's president and the
administrative law judge for the District of Columbia Criminal Courts to
discuss measures to improve the competence level of court-appointed
counsel. 10 9 The first united effort leading to a strike by court-appointed
attorneys representing indigent defendants ended in a smashing victory,
at least for the time being.
III. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SELECTS ITS TARGET
FOR THE FIRST ANTITRUST SUIT BROUGHT AGAINST LAWYERS:
COUNSEL FOR THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT
Three months after the SCTLA's victory, the Commissioners of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) voted to charge the SCTLA with illegal
price fixing"0 and to obtain a cease and desist order prohibiting any
similar action by the SCTLA in the future."' The FTC vote was based
on the claim that the sellers (the court-appointed counsel) of a product
(their representation of indigent defendants) acted together to coerce the
buyer (the District of Columbia) to pay more for their services."i2 The
FTC acted even though the object of the lawyers' strike (the District of
Columbia government) had not sought the FTC's intervention.
The FTC claimed that the court-appointed counsel were competitors for
purposes of antitrust law- they were individual business people providing
the same service and therefore were capable, by restricting output, of
in the importance of quality representation for indigent defendants and believe that this will contribute
to the administration of justice in the District." Id.
108. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 856 F.2d at 238.
109. Individual Respondents' Brief at 7, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (Nos.
88-1198, 88-1393).
110. FTC Charges Lawyers' Group for Alleged Boycott Against Local Government, Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA) A-7 (Dec. 16, 1983). One commissioner did not support the FTC action, another
abstained, and three voted in favor. Id. The three in favor were all appointed by President Reagan, and
some lawyers considered the FTC intervention here to constitute a political attack on labor by a
conservative FTC director and a Republican-dominated Commission. W John Moore, FTC Probes
Labor Antitrust Exemption, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 3, 1983, at I.
11. The FTC brought its action under 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
112. See generally San Juan Racing Ass'n v. Asociacion de Jinetas, 590 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1979)
(holding that race track jockeys' collective refusal to race at the state-controlled track's price constituted
unlawful price fixing). The FTC claimed that no First Amendment principle provides lawyers with
greater rights to advocate additional funding for legal services than are accorded any other suppliers of
services. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
at 9, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393).
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forcing a higher price for their services." 3 A former FTC Commissioner
under the Carter Administration called the suit "utterly wrongheaded
it's astonishing that after three [and one-half] years of bringing virtually
no antitrust suit of any kind, they bring a price fixing case against a
bunch of kids who haven't had a raise in 13 years.""'14
The FTC claim was litigated before an administrative law judge in a
three week hearing. The judge recommended dismissal of the case" s in
part because the victim was "elusive" and the "seller's action [was]
accompanied by the buyer's knowing wink."".6  Of greater import,
however, to Administrative Law Judge Needleman was his conclusion that
there was "no point in striving resolutely for an antitrust triumph in this
sensitive area when this particular case [could] be disposed of on a more
pragmatic basis-there was no harm done."
'
"1 7
Needleman, in fact, went even further. His decision portrayed the
striking lawyers as individuals who sacrificed their own economic well-
being to accomplish what clearly was needed:
[T]he evidence strongly indicates that in this instance the boycott was
viewed by city officials as the only feasible way of getting a rate
increase which was unpopular with the general public but was
supported by virtually all elements of the community concerned with
implementing the public policy behind the Sixth Amendment. " '
113. There is a "labor exemption" to the antitrust laws but the SCTLA never claimed to be a labor
organization for purposes of this exemption. The counsel were not all employees of the same employer
so they were not entitled to the protection of the National Labor Relations Act. In addition, had they
been governmental employees of the District of Columbia and gone on strike, imprisonment or fines
might have been imposed. See 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1988).
114. Al Kamen & Ed Bruske, A Protest to the FTC, WASH. PosT, Apr. 4, 1984, at D2. The former
Commissioner, Robert Pitofsky, then Dean of Georgetown University Law Center, made the comment
one week before the trial before the administrative law judge. One hundred and seven District of
Columbia law school professors joined with Pitofsky in a statement protesting the FTC action. Id. An
editorial in The Washington Post also supported the strikers: "The commission would be well advised
to drop the idea of using the trial lawyers' boycott as a test case for regulating the legal profession.
There is also a great deal of public sympathy in the community for these lawyers, whose work is
valuable and difficult and whose pay hadn't been increased for 13 years." Conspiracy in the Lawyers'
Lounge?, supra note 104, at A12.
115. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, i07 F.T.C. 510, 562 (1986).
116. Id. at 560.
117. Id. at 561. In response, the Commission declared: "Every dollar that the city was required to
pay to end a lawyers' boycott left it with that much less money to spend to feed the hungry, shelter the
homeless, fight drugs, disease and crime, or accomplish any number of other perennially underfunded
public missions that compete with indigent legal care for limited public funds." Petitioner/Cross-
Respondant's Reply Brief at 17, FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (Nos.
88-1198, 88-1393). However, the one Commissioner to vote against the FTC suit shared the concern
of the administrative law judge. Commissioner Pertschuk said the litigation "represents a poor exercise
of prosecutorial discretion." FTC Charges Lawyers' Group for Alleged Boycott Against Local
Government, supra note 110, at A-7.
118. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. at 603.
1993]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The FTC appealed the ruling, and the same Commissioners who voted
initially to bring the action now had to rule on the validity of the decision
to dismiss the action." 9  The Commissioners reversed. 120  The
Commisioners found that the per se standard established by the Supreme
Court in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States'21-that when the agreements of the participants are "so plainly
anticompetitive[,] no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish
their illegality"' 2 2-applied to the action of the court-appointed
counsel.i23
The Commission emphasized the commerce aspect of the court-
appointed counsels' work, and diminished the importance of the service
component. The Commission cited Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar2 4
wherein the Supreme Court held that the practice of a Virginia bar
association to set a minimum fee schedule for a lawyer conducting a title
examination was price fixing and, therefore, per se illegal.'25 That a title
search is clearly a commercial transaction and is quite unlike the
constitutionally mandated act of representing indigent defendants did not
interest the Commission: "A lawyer who provides legal representation for
an indigent defendant also provides a service, and the exchange of this
service for money is also commerce."' 2 6 The FTC failed to appropriately
consider an important factor distinguishing the SCTLA situation from
Goldfarb: it was not the lawyers' group that set the fee, as in Goldfarb,
but rather the legislature for the District of Columbia. 1
119. These Commissioners may have been intent on "getting" the lawyers before the strike even
began. The Washington Post reported more than a week before the job action began that "FTC sleuths
are keeping close tabs on the Lawyers' pre-strike activities, monitoring when they hold the meetings and
what goes on there." Kamen & Bruske, supra note 105, at B2. Once the strike was underway, the FTC
sought tapes from television stations which contained interviews with striking lawyers. Bruske, supra
note 105, at C4.
120. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. at 603.
121. 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (invalidating the National Society of Professional Engineers' ethical canon
which prohibited competitive bidding).
122. Id. at 692.
123. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. at 572-73. The Commission concluded "that
the SCTLA lawyers' concerted refusal to deal for the purpose and with the effect of raising prices is
price fixing and is therefore subject to the per se rule." Id. at 574.
124. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
125. Id. at 793.
126. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass 'n, 107 F.T.C. at 574. This view of labor is inconsistent with
the Clayton Act's statement of policy that "[tlhe labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988).
127. The opinion concluded that the "mere fact that the government, as the only purchaser of
services, was the target does not protect their boycott from regulation." Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. at 599.
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What is perhaps most bothersome about the FTC's position is its clear
lack of concern for the issues underlying the lawyers' strike.' 28 This is
perhaps best exemplified in a statement by the FTC's chief counsel in
charge of the litigation: "[P]eople feel sympathy for these lawyers because
their rates are very low .. but that's just irrelevant. There were
enough lawyers to do this work at minimal quality "129
The Sixth Amendment guarantee to counsel has perhaps never before
been interpreted by a leading government attorney as requiring only
minimal competence. The Code of Professional Responsibility30 and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct' could certainly be interpreted
as requiring a lawyer who consistently provides only minimal
effectiveness to be professionally disciplined.
32
The SCTLA raised two primary defenses in the lengthy hearings before
the Commission, each of which emphasized the SCTLA's entitlement to
immunity from antitrust competition because the Association's actions
were protected by the First Amendment. 33 First, the SCTLA claimed
that its actions fell within the Noerr-Pennington doctrine' 34 -that
128. The disdain and disrespect the FTC Commissioners felt for the court-appointed counsel who
were receiving the same out-of-court compensation rate of $20 an hour that they had 13 years before
is illustrated by a comment maligning the counsel for wanting "the privilege to coerce the District of
Columbia to pay Oldsmobile prices, so that they can profit from the result." Id. at 588 (emphasis added).
129. David 0. Stewart, Trust-busting, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1990, at 48, 50 (emphasis added). The
Commission similarly claimed in its opinion that since there were lawyers who were accepting cases
at the prevailing rates, "the city's offering price before the boycott apparently was sufficient
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. at 570.
130. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY (1980).
131. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
132. For example, Disciplinary Rule 7-101 of the Model Code requires the lawyer to act zealously,
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILiTY DR 7-101 (1980) (emphasis added), and the first Rule
of the Model Rules states that competent representation requires legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness,
and preparation. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 1.1 (1983). For a full discussion of
the applicability of these professional standards to disciplining a criminal defense lawyer for incompetent
representation, see Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, Professional Discipline, and Representation of the
Indigent Defendant, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 1171 (1988).
133. The lawyers' position won support from other professional groups concerned with their own
First Amendment freedoms. For example, the American Medical Association stated:
[T]he AMA believes that the Commission's approach to this case shows insufficient
regard for the First Amendment rights of professional associations and their members.
The AMA's interest in this case is to support the right of professional associations to use
effective means to express their views to the government, including their views on
appropriate levels of reimbursement.
Brief of Amicus Curiae AMA in Support of Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 2, FTC v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393).
134. The Noerr-Pennngton doctrine derived from the Supreme Court decisions in two cases: United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), and Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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political activity undertaken with the goal of obtaining government action
and to influence public officials, even though undertaken for
anticompetitive purposes, is immune from antitrust laws.135  The
Commission, however, held that the actions taken by the SCTLA did not
fall within the Noerr-Pennngton protections because the counsel had
engaged in a coercive boycott and not mere petitioning. 136
Even if Noerr was found not to apply to the actions of the court-
appointed counsel, the second argument of the SCTLA was that there
ought to be a First Amendment exception to the antitrust laws for
nonviolent expressive conduct on issues of public concern. 37  The
SCTLA claimed that this was a political boycott undertaken with the
political objective of furthering the Sixth Amendment rights of indigent
defendants by attempting to obtain conditions which might lead to more
135. The Supreme Court stated in Noerr that "no violation of the [Sherman Antitrust] Act can be
predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws" and that the legality
of the conduct "was not at all affected by any anticompetitive purpose it may have had." Noerr, 365
U.S. at 135, 140. In Pennington, the Supreme Court, reaffirming the Noerr holding, stated that "Noerr
shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or
purpose." Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670. To get their facts within the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the
SCTLA brief to the Supreme Court phrased the question presented as follows: "Whether a legislative
petitioning boycott, directed at both furthering the Constitutional rights of indigent criminal defendants
and the economic benefit of their 'striking' lawyers, is beyond the scope of the antitrust laws." Brief
for the Individual Respondents at i, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (Nos. 88-1198,
88-1393). Compare this to the statement of the issue in the brief of the Federal Trade Commission:
"Whether a naked price-fixing boycott undertaken by economic competitors as part of a larger public
campaign to obtain an increase in fees paid to them by the government is immunized from all antitrust
scrutiny by the First Amendment." Brief for the Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at i, Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393).
136. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. 510, 582 (1986). The SCTLA had argued that
their boycott was protected under Noerr, notwithstanding its coercive aspect, because the purpose of the
conduct was to influence the passage of legislation. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (stating that the claim that expressions had the intention of exerting coercion does
not remove the actions from the protection of the First Amendment).
137. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd in part, 493
U.S. 411 (1990). The SCTLA, in their brief to the Supreme Court, posed this issue as follows: "Whether
a legislative petitioning boycott, in which the primary motive of the boycotters is to engage in political
expression, is beyond the scope of the antitrust laws, even if such conduct causes incidental commercial
effects." Individual Respondents' Brief at i, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (Nos.
88-1198, 88-1393). The Commission responded that the governmental interest in prohibiting restrictions
in competition outweighed any "negligible inhibitions that application of the law here might impose on
the respondents' freedom of expression." Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. at 595; see
also Brief for Amici Curiae Washington Council of Lawyers, Nat'l Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n and
Ass'n of Am. Trial Lawyers in Support of Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 5, 6, Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393) (arguing peaceful boycotts against the
government are mainstream political activities and therefore encompassed by the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine).
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competent representation.138 But whereas the administrative law judge
had determined that the fee increase was necessary to satisfy the political
and constitutional requirements of effective assistance, 39  the
Commission concluded that the goal of the striking lawyers was to obtain
economic benefits and not to accomplish political ends: "The members of
SCTLA explicitly sought to force concessions from the District
government in its role as a buyer of services rather than its role as a
policymaker." 40 The Commission added, "we find unpersuasive the
respondents' argument that they undertook their coercive course of
conduct for altruistic rather than for commercial purposes."'
' 4
'
It was two years before the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals decided the appeal. 42 The circuit court agreed with the FTC
that the court-appointed counsel acted as "competitors,"'' 43 and that,
although "[d]istinguishing between political and economic motives is a
daunting task," the case was more economic than not. 144 The court also
agreed that the case did not fall within Noerr4 because the lawyers did
not limit their activities to the technique of persuasion.
46
The District of Columbia Circuit decision, however, differed from the
Commission's opinion in one crucial respect. The court concluded that the
SCTLA boycott contained an element of expression that deserved First
Amendment protection. 47 Therefore, in accordance with United States
v. O'Brien, 48 restrictions on the protected conduct could be no greater
than that required to preserve competition. 49 Judge Ginsberg applied the
rule of O'Brien in his majority opinion and held that regulation of the
attorneys' actions would be appropriate only if a "sufficiently important
138. See Costello Publishing Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that
boycotts are a staple of political activity).
139. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass', 107 F.T.C. at 560.
140. Id. at 582.
141. Id. at 586.
142. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd in part, 493
U.S. 411 (1990).
143. Id. at 235.
144. Id. at 246. The court relied on a SCTLA statement prior to the boycott that counsel would take
no more cases unless the fees were increased. However, in his concurring opinion, Judge Silberman
concluded that the determination of the appropriate fee for court-appointed counsel was a political issue
despite the self-interest of the SCTLA in raising the matter. Id. at 253 (Silberman, J., concurrmng).
145. See supra note 135.
146. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass', 856 F.2d at 244.
147. Id. at 248. The court rejected the SCTLA clami of absolute First Amendment immunity. Id.
148. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Supreme Court in O'Brien, while upholding the conviction of a
Vietnam War protestor who had burned his draft card, expressed the need to balance any claimed
governmental interest against the right to First Amendment expression. Id. at 367-77.
149. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass', 856 F.2d at 248.
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government interest in regulating the nonspeech expression can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."'" The court
vacated the Commission's ruling and remanded the matter to ascertain
whether there was proof of SCTLA "market power" which would make the
boycott economically coercive and not merely a political pressure
tactic.' 5  The SCTLA had argued that the boycott had been successful
because of political persuasion and lobbying, not because the SCTLA had
market power.5 2  Indeed, the SCTLA had enlisted the support of
politicians, the D C. Bar, judges, and the media in their lobbying efforts.
The FTC petition for reconsideration was denied. 5 3 The FTC then
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari and the SCTLA cross-
petitioned.'5 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on both petitions in
April, 1989 15' The Court found that the boycott was clearly
150. Id. at 248 (quoting O'Bnen, 391 U.S. at 376).
151. Id. at 249-50. Having concluded that there was a per se violation of the antitrust laws, the
Commission had not inquired into the SCTLA's market power. The SCTLA maintained that they had
not had market power since there were many lawyers in the District available to receive court-
appointment to represent indigent defendants who were not members of the SCTLA. It is also true that
the courts could have required any lawyer to accept an appointment to represent an indigent defendant.
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (holding attorneys are officers of the court and are
therefore required to render service when instructed by the court). The Model Rules state that a "lawyer
shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for a good cause." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 (1983). The District of Columbia City Council chose to
respond to the boycott by raising fees; it could have elected to increase the staff of the defender office
and, as is done in many jurisdictions, assigned virtually all cases to the defenders.
152. The FTC was fully aware of the difficulty it would have had in showing that the SCTLA did
indeed have the power to control the market price of their legal services. The FTC referred to the
"unprecedently onerous character of the 'market power' burden thrust on antitrust plaintiffs." Petition
for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit at 19, FTC v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393). In fact, the
administrative law judge's initial decision was based, in part, on his conclusion that the level of fees
set by the D.C. Criminal Justice Act had little to do with ordinary market forces. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. 510, 559 (1986). The Public Defender Service coordinated efforts to have
private counsel who did not usually take court-appointed cases take such cases during the strike. And
in fact, lawyers from some of the District's largest firms-Arnold & Porter, Covington & Burling, and
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickerng--did agree to represent the indigent defendants. Kathleen Sylvester, Afler
12 Years Without an Hourly Rate Rise, D.C. 's Court-Appointed Lawyers Go on Strike, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
19, 1983, at 40. The public defender staff lawyers themselves accepted as many as 32 cases per day,
approximately three times as many as usual. Michael Isikoff, FTC Panel Calls Lawyers' Strike Illegal,
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1983, at BI.
153. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 897 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated and order
of dental re-entered, No. 86-1465, 1990 WL 166448 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 2, 1990).
154. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 57 U.S.L.W. 3590 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1989) (No. 88-
1393).
155. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 490 U.S. 1019 (1989).
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economic, 5 6 that Noerr did not apply, 157 that the per se analysis was
appropriate, 158 and that the boycott had violated antitrust laws. 159 The
FTC's order was reinstated by a 6-3 decision of the Court. The 100
lawyers who were providing a constitutionally mandated service at a
compensation level acknowledged to be outrageously low 16 and which
had not been increased during the thirteen years preceding the strike were
found to have violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. By
insisting on adopting the marketplace basis for its analysis, the Court
sacrificed the interests of the lawyers and their indigent clients.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, considered the social or
political motive of a price-fixing agreement of no consequence.' 6' He
rejected the attorneys' claim that the boycott was a form of political
expression entitled to First Amendment protection.'6 2 Regardless of
counsels' "altruistic" motivation, the crucial factor was their desire to
achieve an increased price for their services. 63 Justice Stevens did,
begrudgingly, acknowledge both the legitimacy of the lawyers' claim for
increased compensation and the need for the strike: "[T]he preboycott
rates were unreasonably low, and the increase has produced better
legal representation for indigent defendants Without the boycott
156. FiC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 426 (1990).
157. Id. at 428.
158. Id. at 434-36.
159. Id. at 436. One irony here is that the lawyers' strike, instead of representing an anticompetitive
action, actually resulted in increased competition among lawyers since the fee increase made the work
more attractive to many. Even one of the FTC commissioners agreed that "[t]he system is working better
than before." Martha Middleton, DC Attorneys Face Antitrust Charges Over Strike, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 2,
1984, at 5.
160. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the Report of the Federal Courts Study
Committee recommended a full review of the sufficiency of compensation provided for in the federal
Criminal Justice Act, and called for an amount adequate to cover overhead and an hourly fee.
161. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1990). This is in direct
contrast to the primary claim of the American Civil Liberties Union: "[A] boycott which, as here,
promotes the constitutional rights of otherwise underrepresented or powerless groups should be protected
from the chilling application of antitrust law." Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU in Support of
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 2, Superior Court Tnal Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (Nos. 88-1198,88-
1393).
162. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 427-28. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit found
in Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980), that the NOW
boycott of Missouri, designed to persuade the state to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment, was
encompassed by the Noerr doctrine protection of political activities to petition the government. Id. at
1315 n. 16. Other cases which protected boycotts that exerted economic pressure in order to accomplish
a change in governmental policies include: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982);
Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980), affd mem., 676 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982); and Coastal States
Marketing Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983).
163. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 424-25.
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there would have been no increase in District CJA fees at least until the
Congress amended the federal statute."'' 64 According to Justice Stevens,
the Noerr provision of antitrust immunity for political boycotts did not,
however, encompass a boycott conducted by business competitors who
stood to profit from the "lessening of competition in the boycotted
market."1
65
Justice Blackmun, however, focused on the lawyers' lack of market
power and found that political, rather than economic, concerns had
controlled the decision to strike: "District officials themselves may not
have genuinely opposed the rate increase, and may have welqomed the
appearance of a politically expedient 'emergency '1166 Justice Brennan
characterized the majority holding as "insensitive," and one which ignored
the historical importance of the boycott as a means of political
communication. 67 But the Court's majority viewed the boycott as a
cartel restricting its supply, and political issues and political mobilization
were of no import.
The Supreme Court's decision is a major setback to counsel representing
the indigent defendant. 168 As was true with the SCTLA lawyers, a strike
would, in any event, be only a matter of last resort. Court-appointed
counsel have few options. In addition, indigent defendants have no
political clout and few politicians dare to advocate the allocation of
additional funds for their legal representation. 69  In this era of
164. Id. at 421.
165. Id. at 427.
166. Id. at 454 (Blackrnun, J., concumng in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun did not
agree with the majority that the per se antitrust rule applied to the boycott. He did, however, agree that
the Noerr doctrine did not provide immunity and that the First Amendment concerns did not require
sanctioning the boycott. Id.
167. Id. at 437 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Justice Brennan also concluded that political pressure
rather than economic coercion was the crucial determinant. Id. at 441-42. Justice Brennan opined that
the majority decision ignored the long history of the trial attorneys' attempts to win political support
and the virtually unanimous support which was achieved once the boycott occurred. Id. at 443.
168. The significance of this case was not lost on other court-appointed counsel programs. Fourteen
states signed on as Amici Curiae in support of the FTC, claiming that any expansion in First
Amendment protections for counsel would cause a loophole in antitrust regulation that would impede
the efforts of the states to preserve and encourage competition. Brief of Amici Curiae 14 States in
Support of Petitioner at 1, FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (Nos. 88-
1198, 88-1393); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit at 17-21, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393)
(asserting that the erroneous holdings of the D.C. Circuit Court threatened effective antitrust enforcement
far beyond this matter).
169. For example, the New York State Legislature has repeatedly failed to increase compensation
rates for assigned counsel despite recommendations from bar associations, legislative committees, and
newspaper editorials. In a 1989 address, the former Chief Judge of New York, Sol Wachtler, urged that
the "rate of compensation for attorneys appointed by the court must be increased as soon as
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governmental deficits and cuts in expenditures at the county, state, and
federal levels, the problems of counsel are steadily becoming
exacerbated. 7 ' If those representing the indigent cannot unite'17  to
fight for more funding to protect the constitutional rights of their
clients,172 the criminal justice system as a whole is sure to suffer. 173
possible." Sol Wachtler, 1989-The State of the Judiciary, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 1989, at 52, 55. The
Legislature not only failed to comply that year, but in 1991 as well. Compensation in New York remains
at the 1985 level of $25 per hour for out-of-court, and $40 per hour for in-court work. Spanenberg
Group, supra note 47, at 28. The failure of the rates to even take into account cost of living increases
has caused attorneys to withdraw from lists of those willing to accept court appointment. See
Rosenbaum, supra note 68, at 7 (reporting that between 1985 and 1988, one county in New York had
a 25% decline in the number of lawyers on the appointment panel while at the same time there was a
106% increase in felony cases). The only "political" support defenders get is typically the platitudes and
"appreciation" from judges. For example, the Chief Justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court recently
stated: "[There] is the need for more full-time public defenders and a generous increase in the
compensation of these dedicated and hard working men and women. While theirs is not a 'popular'
cause, [t]heirs is an invaluable dedication to public service without which many would be denied
access to justice." Monahan, supra note 64, at 7 (quoting Chief Justice Stephens). See also the
comments of United States District Judge Edward Johnstone that defense counsel "shoulder the burden
of seeing that, in the criminal justice system, individual liberties and dignity are not side-stepped or
cheapened. This burden has often been shouldered in the face of overwhelming caseloads, public abuse
and meager pay." Edward H. Johnstone, Some Bicentennial Observations on the Sixth Amendment Right
to Counsel, THE ADVOCATE (Ky. Dep't of Pub. Advoc.), Aug. 1991, at 6 (footnote omitted).
170. The fee in Tennessee for court-appointed counsel had been $20-$30 per hour until the financial
difficulties of the state led to a cut back to $5-$7.50 per hour. David Margolick, Volunteers or Not,
Tennessee Lawyers Help Poor, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1992, at B16. In Seattle, Washington, assigned
counsel receive $22 an hour, an amount unchanged in over 11 years, with the result that experienced
attorneys are withdrawing their names from the list of counsel willing to take court-appointed cases.
STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES Standard I commentary (Wash. Defenders Ass'n 1989).
The Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court appointed a Task Force on Indigent Defense Services
which recommended a doubling in the compensation rate for out-of-court work done by appointed
counsel and a 50% increase in the rate for in-court time. However, in 1991, the Board of Bar
Commissioners voted down the recommendations, causing the Chair of the Alabama State Bar's Indigent
Defense Committee to resign, stating: "We have a real crisis on our hands here in Alabama." Monahan,
supra note 10, at 28 (quoting Dennis Balske, former Chair of the Alabama State Bar's Indigent Defense
Committee).
171. One FTC official stated that it was indeed the purpose of the FTC intervention to prevent future
collective actions by counsel and that a "clear signal" was needed to show the legal community that
such conduct was impermissible. Isikoff, supra note 152, at B8; see also Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. 510, 602 (1986) (discussing the initial cease and desist order as designed specifically
to "prohibit the respondents from initiating another boycott" whenever they became disaffected with the
results or pace of the legislative process).
172. The administrative law judge, on first considering the legality of the SCTLA strike, said of the
lawyers involved: "[Tihere is plenty of evidence that within the corps of CJA regulars are dedicated
lawyers from public interest backgrounds who consider representation of the poor as the highest calling
of the legal profession." Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. at 521.
173. Washington, D.C., presents a good example of the current problem confronting court-appointed
counsel. The District's criminal courts' fee for services has not changed eight years after the boycott,
even though lawyers appearing as court-appointed counsel in criminal cases in the federat courts in
Washington receive $75 per hour. The District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act, which specifies the
1993]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
IV THE PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASELOAD CRISIS
Theoretically, an office staffed by full-time public defenders working
exclusively on cases representing indigent defendants is preferable to a
system which relies on private, court-appointed counsel. A public defender
office, consisting of full-time specialists, relieved of the financial
concerns of running a profitable law office, would be a forceful advocate
of the rights of indigents accused within the criminal justice system.
There would be paralegals, training programs, supervision and assistance,
brief banks, resources for investigators, and time for brainstorming
particular problems.
The reality, however, is far different. To the county or state which is
constitutionally required to provide representation to the indigent
defendant,' 74 the main advantage of the public defender system may be
that it is a cheap method of representing as many cases as possible in the
least amount of time. The assembly line has proven most productive in
many areas of the American economy, and the public defender so
perceived could deliver the required product (any warm body standing
next to an accused) at the lowest possible cost.'
7
The ABA created the Special Committee on Criminal Justice in a Free
Society in 1986 to conduct a multi-year examination of crime and crime
control in the United States. 76  The Committee's report, entitled
compensation level, had been modeled after the federal Criminal Justice Act and for many years the
compensation provided for by each Act was comparable. Court-appointed counsel in the District are
confronted with a District government in very weak financial condition unwilling to allocate more funds
for counsel, a Supreme Court ruling banning them from organizing to take collective action, and morale
so low that lawyers are increasingly becoming discouraged from representing poor people accused of
crime. See Daniel Klaidman, Defining 'Market Force', LEGAL TiMES, Jan. 29, 1990, at 7.
174. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
175. The phrase "assembly-line justice" has been used over the years to describe the operations of
urban public defender offices. The concept may have originated in The Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT IN ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 128 (1967). The report described the factory-like mass processing of
defendants by the criminal justice system, noting that the defendants were not treated as individuals by
anyone, including the overburdened defense counsel. The report concluded that the defendants "are
numbers on dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on their way." Id. A somewhat similar
description occurred 20 years later, referrng to the quality of representation provided to defendants in
New York City: "[L]awyers for the poor in criminal cases infrequently test the state's case and
insufficiently protect defendants' rights. The rights of poor people charged with crime have a life
only in the rhetoric of the system." McConville & Mirsky, supra note 34, at 901.
176. The Committee was chaired by Samuel Dash of the Georgetown University Law Center and
included prosecutors, judges, defense counsel, law professors, and police representatives. CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 7, at 1, 2.
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Criminal Justice in Crisis,'77 noted that as far as the indigent defendant
was concerned, "the problem is not that the defense representation is too
aggressive, but that it is too often inadequate because of underfunded and
overburdened public defender offices.' I7 ' The most significant problem,
the Committee reasoned, was the lack of financial resources.17 9 In the
"chronically underfunded" criminal justice system, the Committee
realized, "even the most well-intentioned lawyers cannot assess the best
interests of their clients if they are continually facing caseloads which
they know they cannot handle."'' 8 0  The Committee concluded that
"indigent defense systems nationwide are underfunded.''
An underfinanced public defender office means too many cases for the
staff attorney 182 A 1990 National Institute of Justice report surveyed
375 counties across the country as part of its National Assessment
Program.8 3 Eighty percent of the defenders contacted believed that there
was a need for more attorneys to represent the indigent and that the
number of defenders had not kept pace with their counties' increasing
caseloads.8 4 Ninety-five percent of defenders believed that their budget
was less than that provided to prosecute indigent defense cases, and 77%
found that the heavy caseloads created problems with retention of staff
due to burnout." 5
177. Id.
178. Id. at 9.
'179. Id. at 39.
180. Id. at 41.
181. Id. This was not the first time the ABA had articulated these concerns. The ABA House of
Delegates in February, 1979 voted to approve the following:
RESOLVED, that the [ABA] supports m principle the establishment of an independent
federally funded Center for Defense Services for the purpose of assisting and
strengthening state and local governments in carrying out their constitutional obligations
to provide effective assistance of counsel for the defense of poor persons in state and
local criminal proceedings.
A.B.A. Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Report to the House of Delegates
1 (1979) (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal). The Report summed up the comprehensive study
by the Standing Committee which "revealed all too clearly that despite the mandates of the United States
Supreme Court, the efforts of th[e] [ABA], and of many defender associations, our adversary system
of criminal justice simply does not function effectively for the majority of poor defendants." Id. at 3.
182. The ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants deemed the caseload
problem the primary reason for its call for a Center of Defense Services. See A.B.A. Standing
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, supra note 181, at 4.
183. NATIONAL INST. OF JuSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: PRELIMINARY SURVEY
RESULTS FOR PUBLIC DEFENDERS (1990).
184. Id. at 3.
185. Id. at 1-4. Sixty-six percent of the directors of defender offices found that the heavy caseload
also made it hard to recruit attorneys. Id. at 4.
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The chief public defender in an office has typically assumed the
obligation to provide representation to all indigents arrested in the
locale.1 6 Therefore, as the numbers of those arrested increase, the chief
will instruct the staff to take more and more clients. But what happens
when the staff defender determines that he can handle no more cases
without violating professional ethics rules and his clients' constitutional
rights? What happens when his employer instructs him to take additional
cases or else be fired?
It is this commentator's contention that the staff defender who decides
that he cannot in good conscience accept additional cases must be
supported in that decision." 7 There is more at stake than just a
traditional employer-employee relationship wherein the employee can be
fired either for any reason, or, if there is a union contract, for "just
cause,"' 188 which most certainly will encompass "insubordination."
There is also the issue of professional self-respect. No one can envision
the incredibly harried and pressured defender as the embodiment of the
professional ideal. Defenders subject themselves not only to possible suits
for malpractice'8 9 and professional discipline for neglecting clients,' 90
but also to contempt of court. For example, one overburdened defender
who was required to be in several courts in one day was held in contempt
and handcuffed to a chair for twenty minutes by a judge who was angry
because the defender arrived late to that judge's courtroom.' 9'
186. The fulfillment of that obligation, however, can vary sharply among the counties of any given
state. For example, a recent statewide study conducted by the California State Bar's Standing Committee
on the Delivery of Legal Services to Criminal Defendants "found that the quality of legal services vaned
from 'outstanding to woefully inadequate,"' and that there was no consistency in the level of legal
services provided throughout the state. GUIDELINES ON INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES DELIVERY
SYSTEMS iv (State Bar of Cal. Bd. of Governors Dec. 1990). As a result of the study, a statewide
commission was formed which ultimately developed voluntary guidelines for systems delivenng indigent
criminal defense services. Id.
187. It is widely acknowledged that private counsel has an obligation not to accept more cases than
they can handle. For example, the State Bar of California's Standards of Representation for court-
appointed counsel states that counsel has the responsibility of "refusing to accept more cases than the
attorney can competently handle." Id. at 12.
188. Approximately 96% of all employer-union contracts include provisions for an outside arbitrator
to resolve disputes. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 745 (11th ed.
1991).
189. For an analysis of malpractice litigation against public defenders, see Klein, supra note 132.
190. For a thorough analysis of the vulnerability of the public defender to professional discipline,
see id. at 1171-1209.
19 1. Richard D. McFadden, Legal Aid Lawyers Stop Work to Protest Judge's Treatment of One of
Their Own, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1991, at B3. More than 100 lawyers staged a wildcat walkout to show
their support of the handcuffed attorney. Legal Aid lawyers said they frequently had to appear at 10-15
hearings a day and often confronted unavoidable scheduling conflicts. Id.
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The staff defender performs constitutionally mandated work. His
performance, like that of all attorneys, is controlled by the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility192 or the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct,193 depending on the jurisdiction in which he practices. It is his
responsibility to ensure that each and every client he represents receives
the effective assistance of counsel. If he determines that to take additional
cases would interfere with the rights of his current clients as well as his
new clients, he must be allowed to refuse to accept the additional cases.
Excessive caseloads for public defenders have been a problem for
years.' "9 4 In recent years, however, the difficulties have worsened. The
ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants found
that, as of 1990, there was an unmistakable trend showing that "caseloads
of most public defenders [had] grown at an alarming rate."'' 9 5 The
United States Department of Justice determined that, in the four years
ending with 1986, caseloads for counsel of the indigent defendant
increased 40%. t9' The project coordinator of the ABA's Bar Information
Program stated regarding public defender offices: "With few exceptions,
the whole country is inadequately funded. Some are desperate, some are
only beginning to feel the effects of it.' 9 7
What is perhaps most disconcerting about the caseload problem is that
it is so longstanding and that it continues to worsen.'98 The caseload
192. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (1980) ("T]he
Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their
professional activities.") (citations omitted); see also Chaleffv. Superior Court, 69 Cal. App. 3d 721,
724 (1977) (stating that the rules of professional conduct apply to all members of the state bar, including
public defenders); Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d 1174, 1175 (10th Cir. 1972) (noting that the
professional obligations of public defenders are identical to those of all attorneys, whether private or
court appointed).
193. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT (1983).
194. For a thorough discussion of the caseload problems of lawyers representing the indigent
defendant, see Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTiNGS CoNST. L.Q. 625, 656-81 (1986).
195. Recent Trends in Indigent Defense Services, INDIGENT DEF. INFO. (A.B.A. Standing Comm. on
Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants' Bar Info. Program), Spring 1990, at 1.
196. U.S. DEP'T JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 1 (Sept. 1988). Eight junsdictions,
including the District of Columbia, doubled or nearly doubled the number of cases involving indigent
defendants. Id. at 6.
197. Stacey Colino, When Justice Goes Begging: The Crisis in Indigent Defense, STUDENT LAW.,
Oct. 1988, at 14.
198. The director of the Defender Division of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
commented on the effect of the recent recession on funding for public defender organizations: "At times
like this, one of the first things governments do is look around and say, 'Why are we paying all this
money to defend these criminals?' So they cut back on the already meager resources available to
indigent defense programs." Margolick, supra note 170, at B16.
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crisis can devastate the morale of often idealistic and dedicated
attorneys. 199
The problems and obstacles in providing quality representation to
indigent defendants are perhaps greatest in large urban areas. The
situation in New York City illustrates the severity of the dilemma. The
low quality of representation in the deluged New York system was noted
as far back as 1963, when a state judiciary committee concluded:
In our judgment, the Legal Aid Society, Criminal Branch, is
severely overtaxed. As a result, the indigent Criminal Court defendant
is not assured of adequate representation. We believe that this fact is
virtually mathematically demonstrable. Bearing in mind the limited
number of attorneys, the large number of cases, the widespread
courtroom locations, and the variety of charges that must be defended,
it is inconceivable to us that even the most dedicated efforts can assure
the average defendant a performance in the usual case on a parity with
that of the average privately retained lawyer.
We fear that, consciously or not, the Legal Aid lawyer is so
hampered by the case burden he must carry in the Criminal Court that
he will seek shortcuts to the detriment of defendants. 20
In 1968, a report of the chief judge of New York warned that "the
addition of twenty Judges to the Criminal Court of the City of New York
[was] an absolute necessity if the administration of criminal justice within
the City of New York [were] not to suffer a breakdown."' ' That same
year Governor Rockefeller referred to the "intolerable conditions" caused
by calendar congestion in the New York City courts. 20 2 An investigative
article reported that some court administrators and lawyers saw the Legal
Aid Society as "just another cog in the criminal court apparatus" and that
the Legal Aid lawyers joined in the general effort to get through the
calendar as quickly as possible regardless of whether justice was being
199. See, e.g., Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834, 839 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (reporting that the attorney
in charge of the Brooklyn office of the Legal Aid Society testified that the excessive caseloads had
completely undermined the morale of the conscientious, hardworking staff), rev'd, 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. dented, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
200. REPORT OF THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY ON THE
PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES IN THE CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, LEG. Doc. No.
37, 186th Sess. 17, 18 (1963).
201. THIRTEEN [sic] ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF NEW YORK (1968), cited in CRIMINAL COURTS COMM., ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, SAVING THE CRIMINAL COURT: A REPORT ON THE CASELOAD CRISIS AND
ABSENCE OF TRIAL CAPACITY IN THE CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 8 (Jan. 7, 1983)
[hereinafter SAVING THE CRIMINAL COURT] (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
202. GOVERNOR'S MESSAGE ON JUDICIARY LAW, NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 407,433
(1968), cited in SAVING THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 201, at 8.
[V1ol. 68:363
VINEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
done.2 °3 In 1970, the presiding justices of the Appellate Divisions,
charged with reviewing appeals arising from New York City courts,
reported that an overwhelming number of cases had resulted in an
increasing backlog, long delays, and "inadequate attention to individual
cases and individual defendants. 20 4 The justices noted that each of the
three major New York City newspapers had recently reported the serious
problems resulting from the overwhelming caseload.2 5
The New York Legislature in 1972 enacted a "finding" that "there is an
emergency of grave dimensions in the processing of felony charge cases
in the criminal courts in the metropolitan counties of the state. '20 6 The
legislature appropriated $6,700,000 to be used for an emergency felony
case processing program. 207 The next year, following two days of public
hearings, the chairman of the Board of Corrections of the City of New
York issued a report emphasizing the caseload crisis facing Legal Aid
attorneys:
As long as their caseloads remain at the present staggering levels, it is
impossible for Legal Aid attorneys to form productive relationships
with their clients, thoroughly investigate and prepare their cases,
counsel their clients, and take an active role in the sentencing process.
In short, an attorney with an active caseload of 100 felony cases cannot
provide effective representation to his clients.08
Underfunding of the Legal Aid Society, a private, not-for-profit agency
contracting with the city to represent indigent defendants, has been a
perpetual problem, and indeed a most significant cause of inadequate.
representation. In 1972, although the Legal Aid Society represented 75%
of all defendants in New York City, the Society's Criminal Defense
Division received only 37% of the funds that the district attorney offices
received." 9 Legal Aid attorneys voted to strike in 1982,2"0 partly in
203. Edward C. Burkes, City Courts Face a Growing Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1968, at 41, 44.
204. Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Society, 312 F. Supp. 1105, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (appendix) (statement
of the presiding justices of the Appellate Division's First and Second Departments, May 3, 1970).
205. Id.
206. 1972 N.Y. Laws 496, § 1.
207. Wallace v. Kern, 371 F. Supp. 1384, 1385 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 499 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
208. Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (quoting report by William J. vanden
Heuvel, chairman of the Board of Corrections of the City of New York, Mar. 25, 1973), rev'd, 481 F.2d
621 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
209. Brief for Amicus Curiae Association of Legal Aid Attorneys of the City of New York, at 9 n.3,
Wallace v. Kern, 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973) (No. 73-1826), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
210. The precipitating factor leading to the strike was the Legal Aid Society's firing of a lawyer days
after he had sought caseload relief through a contractually provided arbitration mechanism and had
informed the court that his excessive caseload imperiled the constitutional rights of his clients. See Letter
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response to the "soaring workloads" which "constituted a threat to quality
representation, and placed in unmistakable jeopardy the constitutional
right of the indigent to adequately prepared counsel in criminal
proceedings." 2 1' The contractual settlement which ended the strike after
ten weeks called for the creation of a joint labor/management committee
designed to deal with working conditions.1 2
In 1983, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York issued a
report which seemed to realize the odds against any positive steps being
taken: "This report is a plea for attention to the essential needs of the
Criminal Court of the City of New York."2 3 The tone of the report is
one of exasperation. "Because of the staggering volume of its caseload
and its inability to provide trials, the Criminal Court has been virtually
incapacitated in the last few years. Everyone exposed to the Court knows
this-victims, defendants, witnesses, police officers, lawyers on both
sides, court personnel and judges. 21 4
Two years later, Legal Aid attorneys averaged caseloads of 439 clients
per year, 21 '5 and the quality of representation provided to the poor was
criticized in perhaps the harshest of terms in a draft report prepared for
the Committee on Criminal Advocacy of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York:
What passes for "representation" in this system is the presence of
a body, any body, next to the defendant. It is not simply a question of
incompetence, though that exists. It is not a question of poor quality
from Carl L. Gersti, President, Association of Legal Aid Attorneys, to Mayor Edward I. Koch, New
York City 3-5 (Apr. 21, 1983) (ALAA Response to the Keenan Commission's Report) (copy on file
with the Indiana Law Journal); E.R. Shipp, Dispute Over a Dismissal Causes Legal Aid Strike, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1982, § 1, at 29; Advertisement, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 30, 1982, at 5. The Association of
Legal Aid Attorneys placed an advertisement five weeks after the strike began, entitled "The Legal Aid
Society Fired Weldon Brewer but It Could Have Been Any of Us," because the association wanted "the
legal community to be aware of the deteriorating conditions in [the] city's courts which result in
assembly-line justice," and that excessive caseloads had become "the order of the day." Id.
211. Letter from Carl L. Gerstl, supra note 210, at 4. In the 18-month penod preceding the strike
vote, the number of indictments in New York City had increased 42% while the Legal Aid Society's
staff had increased only 16%. Id. Defenders in one Kentucky county public defender office reacted
differently to excessive caseloads due to inadequate funding-they all quit. Karen Herzog, Public
Defenders Quit, THE ADVOCATE (Ky. Dep't of Pub. Advoc.), Aug. 1990, at 13. One of the defenders
reasoned that he was no longer "doing these people justice." Id.
212. Letter from Carl L. Gerstl, supra note 210, at 6.
213. SAVING THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 201, at 1 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
215. Stanley Penn, Seeking Justice: How Public Defenders Deal with the Pressure of the Crowded
Courts, WALL ST. J., July 5, 1985, § 1, at 1, 21.
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or ineffective representation. In operational and structural terms, it is
a system of non-representation.216
The next year, the Queens office of Legal Aid voted to file an office-wide
caseload grievance.217 Indictments had risen almost 100% from the year
before, yet the staff had decreased by more than 20%.2I8
As was true elsewhere, but perhaps to the greatest extent in New York,
the drug crisis of the late 1980s led to overcrowding of the criminal
courts.21 9 The number of felony drug indictments in New York City
more than tripled between 1985 and 1990,220 and 36% of all indictments
filed in New York State in 1987 involved drug charges in contrast to only
16% in 19 8 3 .221 The-New York Times reported in 1989 that:
New York City's criminal-justice system is in a state of crisis, just
barely able to cope with a growing flood of new drug cases generated
by the Police Department's drive against crack, according to judges,
prosecutors, correction officials and Legal Aid lawyers [O]fficials
say there are not nearly enough Legal Aid lawyers to represent
indigent suspects.222
The problem, as usual, is one of finances.2 23 The police were allocated
216. David Margolick, City Bar Panel Faults Lawyers for Poor, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1985, at B3
(quoting a report by a committee of the New York City Bar Association). The final report of the Bar's
Criminal Advocacy Committee in the fall of 1986 described the assigned counsel system as "thoroughly
discredited and unworkable in its current form "COMM. ON CRIMINAL ADVOCACY, ASS'N OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, A SYSTEM IN CRISIS: THE ASSIGNED COUNSEL PLAN IN NEW YORK:
AN EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 4 (1986). The report noted that defendants were
being deprived of a decent defense by counsel who continuously fail them and concluded that the
existing system "must be changed immediately." Id. at 14.
217. N.Y.C. Association of Legal Aid Attorneys, ALAA ORGANIZER, Mar. 1986, at 1.
218. Id.
219. Sixty-five percent of the increase in felony arrests for 1989 versus 1988 were attributable to
drug arrests. See, e.g., Peter Kerr, Drug Court Cuts New York Backlog, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1988, § 1,
at 1. Whereas it certainly is true that the number of civil cases has risen across the country, the increase
does not approach that of criminal cases, especially those which are drug related. For example, in
California superior courts between 1978 and 1986, civil case filings increased 17% while criminal cases
rose 114%. Alan Rothenberg, Assembly Line Justice Threatens the Whole System, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13,
1990, at B7.
220. See Wachtler, supra note 169, at 52. The rapid increase in drug indictments was not limited to
the city; suburban areas and upstate New York also had substantial increases. Id. The Chief Judge of
the New York Supreme Court believed that the trend which has produced the record caseload increases
would continue. Id.
221. Drug Cases Clogging Criminal Courts, N.Y. L., Nov. 22, 1988, at 1. Responding to the
climate of the day, the prosecutors were treating the drug cases more senously-in 1983 only 35% of
felony drug arrests led to actual prosecutions, in contrast to 51% in 1987. The governor's director of
criminal justice stated: "Drug crimes have assumed top priority with the state's prosecutors." Id.
222. David E. Pitt, Surge in New York Drug Arrests Sets Off Criminal Justice Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 1989, at Bl.
223. The caseload crisis in the New York City Criminal Courts could have led to the formulation
of the adage, "the more things change, the more they stay the same." In 1970, the presiding justice of
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substantial special funding to focus on street-level drug purchases with no
corresponding increase to the Legal Aid Society224 which must represent
many of the additional people arrested with the same number of attorneys
employed previously 225
The situation has continued to worsen, and in 1989 the head of the
Criminal Defense Division of the Legal Aid Society indicated that the
office was drowning in new cases and needed additional funds just to
survive.22 6 One hundred fifty-five new lawyers were needed just to
return matters to where they had been just a short time before.227 The
deputy chief administrative judge for the New York City courts warned
that prosecutions in drug cases were "coming in too fast [and that] if
we are not careful the system will come to a standstill."22 s
The primary concern of courts and judges in dealing with these new
cases 22 9 is not to ensure that quality, competent representation is
the New York appellate department responsible for supervising the City's courts stated:
During the past several months, each of the city's three major newspapers has called
attention to the serious problems in processing an overwhelming number of cases in the
Criminal Courts of the City of New York. These problems are manifested by an
increasing backlog of cases, longer delays in processing cases to disposition, and
inadequate attention to individial cases and individual defendants.
Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Society, 312 F. Supp. 1105, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
224. This imbalance may change somewhat. In May, 1990, New York State enacted a statute which
mandated that funds received by the state from the Federal Government Drug Control and System
Improvement Grant Program be allocated in accordance with a 60:40 formula: of every dollar allocated,
60 cents goes to the prosecutor's office and 40 cents to the Legal Aid Society. 1990 N.Y. Laws 192,§ 2.
225. Pitt, supra note 222.
226. Daniel Wise, Flip Side of Anti-Drug Drive Is Understaffed Court System, N.Y. L., Mar. 23,
1989, at 1. In the eight month period betwen September, 1988, and April, 1989, the caseload of the
Criminal Defense Division of the Legal Aid Society increased 30% and the society expected to lose 20%
of its staff. Shaun Assael, Legal Aid Seeks Funds for New Counsel, MANHATrAN LAW., Apr. ii, 1989,
at 8.
227. Id. Even in the days before crack cocaine, however, the New York City Legal Aid Society had
not expended much money or allocated. much attorney time for the cases the Legal Aid Society
represented. An exhaustive analysis of the Legal Aid Society led researchers to conclude that the Legal
Aid Society survived in New York City "because they engage in low cost, expeditious case processing."
McConville & Mirsky, supra note 34, at 1261. McConville and Mirsky found that in the 1980s, as
caseloads grew and the number of attorneys diminished, the Legal Aid Society's management
"subordinated adversarial advocaey-'diligent,' 'vigorous,' and 'individualized' defense-to the need
for productivity and efficiency." Id. at 687-88 (citation omitted).
228. Wise, supra note 226, at 1. The Criminal Court of New York may well be the busiest court of
record in the world. See Wachtler, supra note 169, at 42. The two federal court districts encompassing
New York City demonstrate this increase. As of June, 1991, pending criminal cases were up by 28.5%
from the year before in the eastern district of New York, and were up by 15.3% in the southern district.
Daniel Wise, City's Federal Trial Courts Show Rise in Pending Cases, N.Y. L., Sept. 11, 1991, at I.
229. There are those who would argue that although caseloads in the courts have certainly increased,
if the judges spent the time in the courtroom that they were supposed to, there mIght be no crisis at all.
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provided to all, but rather that the cases be processed more rapidly than
ever.2 30 A 1983 report of the New York City Bar stated that "[b]ecause
of the staggering volume of its caseload and its inability to provide trials,
the [New York City] Criminal Court has been virtually incapacitated for
the last few years."2 31 The report noted that a "by-product of congestion
itself is that judicial performance is measured by the ability to move
cases. That is inevitable, but the intense pressure on judges to keep pace
with volume leads sometimes to injustice. 232
The caseload crisis which was precipitated in large part by the surge in
the number of drug cases is certainly not limited to New York. 233
Caseloads have increased throughout the federal court system, creating
what the director of the federal court system's Administrative Office has
characterized as "a tremendous squeeze on the Federal court system." '234
A 1990 "blue ribbon" panel appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist to study
federal court operations termed the caseload "enormous" and concluded,
"[t]he federal court's most pressing problems-today and for the
See Ellen J. Pollock & Timothy Sullivan, Breakdown on Centre Street, MANHATTAN LAW., May 30,
1989, at 1 (reporting that court-watchers went into criminal courts on one day and found that the judges
were actually on the bench for an average of four hours and twenty-seven minutes per day).
230. There was a secondary concern: courthouse space to handle the new cases. See Top Judge Tours
Courthouse, Highlighting Space Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1989, at B3 (citing former Chief Judge
Sol Wachtler's comment that justice was degraded by conversion of small offices into courtrooms and
by the desperate need for additional space); David E. Pitt, Judge Calls for Sentencing on Rikers Island,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1989, at BI (reporting that the'space emergency resulted in jail space being
converted into makeshift courtrooms for sentencing prisoners).
231. SAVING THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 201, at 2.
232. Id. at 17. Overcrowding of New York City's jails had become so severe that the corrections
commissioner feared it would be necessary to release thousands of inmates. Selwyn Raab, More Jail
Crowding May Force Release of Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1991, § 1, at 25.
233. The National Institute ofJustice in 1990 conducted an assessment of the needs of public defense
organizations and found that excessive caseloads were a "major problem" for over half of the responding
offices and that the increasing number of drug cases was a major problem for 65% of the offices. John
Arango, Defense Services for the Poor, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1991, at 53; see, e.g., Public Defender
Cuts Cases Back, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1988, at B6 (reporting that the San Francisco public defender
will stop representing indigents charged with misdemeanors and cut its felony caseload by 20% because
of an enormous increase in drug cases). In Chicago, arrests for drug-related crimes increased 159%
between 1984 and 1988; in Memphis, 60% of the criminal court cases are now drug offenses. Timothy
R. Murphy, Indigent Defense and the U.S. War on Drugs: The Public Defender's Losing Battle, CRIM.
JUST., Fall 1991, at 14, 16.
234. Richard L. Berke, Surging Criminal Cases Jam Federal Court System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
1989, at A24. The Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States was so
concerned in 1991 that pending congressional legislation could lead to an even higher number of drug
cases entering federal courts, that the Conference's Committee on Criminal Law and Probation
Administration attempted to block passage in the House of a bill that had been approved by a vote of
71 to 26 in the U.S. Senate. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Citing Caseload, Federal Judges Assail 2
Provisions in Crime Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1991, § 1, at 19.
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immediate future-stem from unprecedented numbers of federal narcotics
prosecutions More judgeships are essential. '235  The report
recommended that many of the "new drug cases now flooding the federal
system" be prosecuted in state courts, "returning the federal courts to their
proper, limited role in dealing with crime." 236 The panel found that drug
cases constituted 44% of federal criminal trials and 50% of criminal
appeals, and "as a result, some districts with heavy caseloads [were]
virtually unable to try civil cases and others [would] soon be at that
point.
237
In San Francisco, the number of crack arrests more than doubled in
1988 and although the prosecutor's office received additional funds to
handle the increased caseload, the public defender's office did not.238
Each defender handled an average of 260 cases a year.2 39 In Los
Angeles, as of 1990, 75% of all criminal prosecutions were drug
related.240 The situation was similar elsewhere in the region as well. The
director of the western regional office of the National Center for State
Courts stated that although the prosecutor offices and the law enforcement
agencies have received additional funding for the new drug cases, neither
the defender offices nor the courts have obtained any monies.24'
The chief public defender for a four-county area in Kentucky admitted
that clients are not adequately represented because of insufficient staff due
to inadequate funding.242 He complained that the state's prosecutor
235. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 45, at 35-36.
236. Id. at 36.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. In comparison, the standard for the maximum allowable number of cases which has been
adopted by the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals and endorsed
by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association and the ABA is 150 felonies per attorney annually.
See CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 7, at 42-43. The ABA report adds:
Emphasis should be placed on the fact that these guidelines set the maximum conceivable
caseload that an attorney could reasonably manage. These numbers are unrealistic in the
absence of ideal support conditions or if the public attorney is carrying any number of serious
or complex cases or death penalty cases.
Id. at 68 n.87 (emphasis in original).
240. Rothenberg, supra note 219, at B7.
241. Jean Guccione, Courts Seize Power Over Caseloads, S.F BANNER DAILY J., Jan. 3, 1990, at
1, 6; see also ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., NATIONAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE
SYSTEMS STUDY 27 (1986) (observing that funding for indigent defense services is low compared to that
of other criminal justice functions).
242. David W Doan, Pendleton, Robertson, Harrison, Nicholas Public Defender System, THE
ADVOCATE (Ky. Dep't of Pub. Advoc.), June 1989, at 3; see also Lisha Gayle, Defenders Face Money
Woes, Director Says, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Jan. 22, 1988, at Ai (reporting that the lack of funding
by the state has led to a hiring freeze and erodes the quality of justice).
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offices "have over 3 times the financial resources that we have. They have
a huge investigative advantage over us. In fairness, our funding should be
more in line with the prosecution's. Resources influence results."243 The
public defender of Dade County, Florida, submitted a report to the Florida
Judicial Council stating that there were so many cases that his staff was
not able to handle them in a "timely and professional manner." '244 Actual
caseloads in 1989 approached 1,200 per attorney in Miami and
Tallahassee.245
In 1990, the Philadelphia district attorney described that city's criminal
justice system as being "on the verge of collapse. 24 6 In Vermont, the
need for more judges to work on the criminal docket, especially in light
of cut-backs in funding from the legislature, led the Vermont Supreme
Court to declare a five-month moratorium on jury trials in some civil
cases in order to allow these courts to keep working on their criminal case
backlog.247 All civil trials in San Diego Superior Court were suspended
for three weeks in 1989 because the judges were needed to handle
243. Doan, supra note 242, at 3. Prosecutors everywhere, however, are not faring so well. The Seattle
District Attorney's Office did not have sufficient staffto keep up with the 70% increase in felony cases
in the period from 1986 to 1990, an increase attributed almost exclusively to drug cases. The chief
prosecuting attorney proceeded to swear in 32 volunteer lawyers from private practice as "special
deputies" to aid in disposing of a backlog of 500 cases. Robb Condon, Volunteer Prosecutors End
Backlog of Drug Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1990, at B6; see also Ted Cilwick, Deputy DA 's, A.B.A.
J., Oct. 1990, at 28 (reporting that Portland, Oregon, and Spokane, Washington, have programs wherein
private lawyers volunteer to prosecute cases for overburdened district attorney offices). See generally
Hugh Nugent & J. Thomas McEwen, Prosecutors' NationalAssessment ofNeeds, NAT'L INST. OF JUST.:
REa. IN ACTIoN (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 1988, at 1 (noting that 58% of
prosecutors surveyed indicated that the number of prosecutors has not kept pace with caseloads; staff
shortages were considered by more prosecutors to be the "most serious problem" confronting the
offices).
244. Florida Public Defenders Call for Restructuring of Indigent Defense Funding, INDIGENT DEF.
INFO. (A.B.A. Standing Comm. on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants' Bar Info. Program), Spring 1990,
at 3.
245. Id.
246. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Philadelphia Justice System Overwhelmed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
1990, at AI. The chiefjustice of Pennsylvania commissioned a report analyzing conditions in the state's
criminal justice system. The report revealed that the average criminal case took 245 days from arrest
to final disposition and that there was a backlog of more than 12,000 criminal cases; the sheriff's office
regularly failed to bring the right defendant to the right courtroom on time; and judges were able to
handle only about half as many cases as did their counterparts in other major cities. The report
concluded, "Either the road to justice in Philadelphia is cleared and improved, or it will shortly become
impassable." Id. at A24.
247. Charles-Edward Anderson, Budget Woes Delay Justice, A.B.A. J., May 1990, at 16. Interestingly
enough, a lower federal court judge found the Vermont Supreme Court order to be unconstitutional
because the order impeded the "historic importance" of the right to trial by jury. Charles-Edward
Anderson, Budget Trials: Lower Court Strikes Down Vermont Cost-Cutting Jury Moratorium, A.B.A.
J., June 1990, at 23.
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criminal cases.24 8 The chief justice of California stated in his 1990 State
of the Judiciary Address: "[D]rug cases are swamping the courts. The
system has begun to take on so much water we are close to foundering.
Too often, civil cases get drowned." '249 In Michigan, drug arrests have
increased 30%, resulting in unmanageable caseloads for public defenders
throughout the state.250
In Atlanta, the rapidly increasing crime rate, compounded by a local
"war on drugs," has led to a "breakdown ' 251' and a "near collapse '252
of the indigent defense system. Though arraignment days have been
added, one superior court judge said that the courts were "drowning" in
cases. 253 Another judge routinely lines defendants up en masse to take
their guilty pleas.25 Public defenders claim they can no longer provide
effective representation, and the local daily law journal has concluded that
in Atlanta the system has become "slaughterhouse justice." 55 Recently,
a group called "1,000 Lawyers for Justice" was formed in an effort to
relieve the overburdened defense system. The group sent a letter to every
lawyer in the Atlanta metropolitan area requesting them to represent for
free at least one indigent defendant. 6
However, an awareness of how the indigent defense system suffers from
under-funding and excessive caseloads does not necessarily lead to
change. 7 In Alabama, ten reports over an eleven-year period dealt with
248. Rothenberg, supra note 219, at B7.
249. Timothy R. Murphy, Indigent Defense: The Impact of the Drug Crisis and the Federal Response
I (1990) (bnefing paper prepared for the Conference of ChiefJustices and the Conference of State Court
Administrators) (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
250. Id. at 3. The Phoenix Public Defender Office handled twice as many drug cases in 1989 as it
did in 1987. Id.
251. Renaud & Woolner, supra note 48, at 2.
252. Id. at 5 (comment of Vernon S. Pitts, director of the Atlanta Public Defender Office).
253. Id. at 2. Fulton County Superior Court Judge Joel J. Fryer elaborated: "We're drowning and
we're going to get drownder." Id.
254. Id. at I.
255. Id. The journalists explained that "[s]o crushing is the caseload and so unrelenting the demand
for speed in Fulton Superior Court that lawyers representing indigents have a term for arraignment day:
'Meet 'em and plead 'em."' Id.
256. 1,000 Lawyers for Justice, A.B.A. PUB. DEFENDER F (A.B.A. Section of Criminal Justice
Defense Servs. Comm., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 1992, at 1. The program is supported by the Atlanta
Bar Association, the State Bar of Georgia, the Georgia Association of Cnminal Defense Lawyers, and
the Georgia Indigent Defense Council. Id.
257. Civil legal services programs have been plagued by some of the same caseload problems as the
offices which represent indigents in criminal cases. See Leroy D. Clark, Legal Services Programs-The
Caseload Problem, or How to Avoid Becoming the New Welfare Department, 47 J. URBAN L. 797, 809
(1970) (stating that legal services offices should not tolerate excessive caseloads; the issue should be
brought to the courts and to the legislatures, which have the responsiblity to ensure that some
"semblance ofjustice prevails").
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difficulties in the state's methods of providing representation to the
indigent defendant.2 58 In 1988, the ABA's Bar Information Program
prepared an analysis of the defense delivery system for the chief justice
of the Alabama Supreme Court and found that lawyers representing
indigent defendants worked under great hardship, that the system for
providing defense lawyers was still "substantially underfunded," and that
all the reports in the past have produced "little concrete result." 259 A
year later, the chairman of the Alabama Task Force on Indigent Defense
observed that "the problems of indigent defense in our state have been
studied to death. 2 60
Problems recently have been exacerbated because defense services have
not received the funding that has been given to prosecutors and law
enforcement agencies as part of federal expenditures for the "war on
drugs. '261 The staff attorney for the National Center for State Courts
estimated that in 1990 more than 80% of individuals arrested for drug
offenses were indigents entitled to court-appointed counsel.2 62 The
Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA),263 which awards grants from the
Drug Control and System Improvement Grant Program and the
Discretionary Grants Program, routinely excludes state and local indigent
defense offices from eligibility for the funds.264
The BJA's director has stated, "BJA's review of past and present state
drug strategies has not identified separate criminal defense services as a
priority area. ' 265 An illustration of the rigidity of the BJA's policy is
258. Robert L. Spangenberg, The Spangenberg Group, Executive Summary: Review of the Indigent
Defense System in Alabama 3 (June 1988) (prepared under the sponsorship of the A.B.A. Bar Info.
Prog. for the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court and the Administrator of the Courts) (copy
on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
259. Id. at 8-9.
260. Letter from Judge Robert L. Hodges, Chairman of the Task Force on Indigent Defense, to Chief
Justice E.C. Hornsby of the Alabama Supreme Court 4 (Nov. 6, 1989) (copy on file with the Indiana
Law Journal). The chief justice appointed the task force to review the recommendations set out in a
1988 ABA-sponsored study. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 16, at 1.
261. The "drug war" is being waged at local levels as well. For example, felony drug arrests in New
York City increased 20% in 1989 from 1988 levels, with the increase attributable to the newly created
Tactical Narcotic Teams of the Police Department. See Murphy, supra note 249, at 400.
262. Id. at 404.
263. The Bureau of Justice Assistance was established by an act of Congress to provide funds and
establish programs "to improve the functioning of the criminal justice system with emphasis on violent
crime and senous offenders." Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3751(b) (1988). The director
of the Bureau is appointed by the President and reports to the U.S. Attorney General.
264. DEFENSE SERVICES COMM., AM. BAR ASs'N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, DEFENSE SERVICES
FUNDING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 389, 392-93 (1990) (copy on file with the Indiana Law
Journal).
265. Letter from Charles Smith, Director, Bureau of Justice Assistance, to Scott Wallace, Legislative
Director, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (Mar. 6, 1990), quoted m full in DEFENSE
SERVICES COMM., supra note 264, at 413-15.
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that a $190,000 grant to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas'
Probation Office was held up when the Bureau learned that $28,000 was
to go to fund a position in the public defender office.166 Not until that
funding was completely eliminated from the proposal did the BJA fund the
overall program. 67
The situation in Kentucky shows how intolerable the financing problem
has recently become. Drug arrests in Kentucky rose 114% between 1987
and 1991 268 In fiscal year 1990 alone, the police and prosecutors in
Kentucky received $4.6 million from civil seizures and forfeitures in drug
cases; the defenders received none of this money 269 In one year,
Kentucky's prosecutors and police received $6 million in grants for drug
prosecutions under the Federal Comprehensive Crime Control Act;
Kentucky's defenders received nothing.270 When these funds are added
to the standard operating budgets, the prosecutors and police received $14
for each $1 allocated to public defense.2 7'
The ABA Special Committee on Criminal Justice in a Free Society
272
was repeatedly confronted with accounts of under-funding of public
defender offices and was "shocked by the intolerably overburdened
condition of a public defender agency in [one] jurisdiction ," noting
that "the delays created because overworked defenders cannot prepare
their cases promptly [are] the single largest problem facing the prosecutor
there. '273 One prosecutor reported to the Committee: "The major
problem is the lack of public defenders. The only answer is for the State
to grant more money to the Public Defender System With more
public defenders, cases would be disposed of more quickly "274 The
irony of a prosecutor calling for more money for his adversaries points
out the extent of the crisis and shows that the whole criminal justice
system suffers when one primary part of that system simply cannot
properly function.
266. See Murphy, supra note 249, at 411. The purpose of the Philadelphia project was to operate an
accelerated drug-case management and early disposition program. Id.
267. Id.
268. Monahan, supra note 10, at 28.
269. Id. at 27.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 28.
272. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 7.
273. Id. at 43 (emphasis added). The various components of the criminal justice system, however,
are interconnected. See, e.g., Tyler v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 531, 536 (E.D. Mo. 1990) ("A chain
is no stronger than its weakest link. [I]ncreasing the productivity of one link in that chain without
commensurate funding for the other links in the criminal justice system is to reap delay, failure, and
continued mistrust of the courts and the criminal justice system.,).
274. CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 7, at 68.
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As one would expect, courts themselves at times recognize the
ineffective assistance provided by public defenders. In Sanchez v
Mondragon,2 " the Tenth Circuit reviewed a claim by a defendant that
he was denied competent representation by his defender, who was not
prepared and did not even know "what was going on in the case. ' 27 6 The
court responded: "Given the well-known, overworked state of many public
defenders, it is possible that Sanchez's lawyer was insufficiently prepared,
and that his attempts to persuade Sanchez to plead guilty were affected by
his lack of preparation. "277
Some judges may tolerate the inadequacy of the public defender office
for the indigent, but find unacceptable the idea that only a public defender
may represent someone who had money but whose funds have been seized
by the government under the Federal Fee Forfeiture Statute. While
considering the constitutionality and ramifications of that statute, Judge
Oakes commented in his dissenting opinion in United States v
Monsanto:279 "Can we seriously contend that a proper balance would be
effected in such cases by giving a defendant made 'indigent' by the
government's assertion of a potential fee forfeiture claim, a young
attorney from an underfunded, overworked public defender's office for the
ensuing 6-15 month trial?"
280
Such young, "overworked" attorneys are on a daily basis representing
indigent individuals who face substantial jail time, life imprisonment, or
even the death penalty When liberty is at stake, it is never appropriate to
have attorneys who are unable to adequately and competently prepare and
investigate their clients' cases.
Although rare, courts have acted to prevent continued representation by
overburdened public defenders. 28 ' The chief circuit judge of Fairfax
County, Virginia, concluded that the county public defender office was so
ineffective that he warned: "If we feel they cannot handle the number of
cases they are accepting, we will put a cap on it and I feel an obligation
275. 858 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled by United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577 (10th Cir.
1990).
276. 1d. at 1466 (quoting defendant Andrew A. Sanchez).
277. Id. at 1466-67 (emphasis added).
278. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988).
279. 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987) (Oakes, J., dissenting), vacated, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en
banc), rev'd, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
280. Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
281. For a comprehensive view of the more common judicial response to the overburdened defense
counsel, see Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact of
Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531 (1988).
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to do that for the individuals they are representing. "282 Another judge
in that jurisdiction argued that the under-funding had led to inadequate
lawyering, and that there must be significantly greater funding.8 3
The defendants themselves are aware of the level of representation
offered by many public defender offices, and it is not uncommon for a
defendant to choose to represent himself or herself rather than to accept
defender representation. In United States v Pina,8 4 the defendant
refused to be represented by a public defender and asked the judge to
appoint another attorney to represent him. The defendant argued that the
lawyers in the defender office were simply not able to provide competent
representation. The judge refused to appoint anyone other than a public
defender. The defendant subsequently chose to represent himself.2 5
The same budget cutbacks affecting the public defender trial offices
affect the appellate bureaus.286 In Chicago, for example, where the
caseload of the Illinois appellate defender office was expected in 1989 to
increase by 30%, there was nevertheless a reduced budget for the office
which led to a 20% reduction in the staff.28 7
To maintain, however, that there is a need for more appellate defenders
ought not to imply that appeals are often successful, especially when the
claim on appeal is ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The opinion
of a Texas court of appeals in Wallace v State28 8 typifies the attitude
of courts reviewing such claims:
We have previously expressed our displeasure with the frequency
of groundless charges of ineffective assistance of counsel made by
other counsel. It appears that judicial resources could and should be
better utilized. Although this opinion would not ordinarily be
published, we have ordered publication to place of record this problem
282. Caryle Murphy, Virginia's Defenders' Offices Get Mixed Reviews, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1988,
at D 1. The public defender office in Fairfax County, Virginia, was created by the state legislature several
years earlier because the low compensation provided for court-appointed counsel had created a crisis
situation wherein few lawyers were willing to accept assignments to represent indigent defendants. Low
Fees Cut Legal Servicefor the Poor, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1987, at Al.
283. Murphy, supra note 282, at D5.
284. 844 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1988).
285. Id. at 6 (upholding denial of defendant's request for outside counsel).
286. There have been some recent, isolated pieces of good news for defender offices. In 1990,
Kentucky increased by 17% the allocation to the state's public defender offices, raising entry-level
salaries from $16,600 to $21,600. The public defenders in New Mexico received a budget increase of
39%, and Missouri's statewide defender program received funds for the hiring of 100 additional
attorneys and support staff. Monahan, supra note 47, at 24.
287. Janan Hanna, More Appellate Defenders Needed: Panel, CHICAGO DAiLY L. BuLL., Dec. 27,
1988, at 3.
288. 761 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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in the area of totally frivolous appeals. While we jealously guard the
right of appellate review, the problem of overburdening our appellate
courts with frivolous appeals needs to be addressed." 9
The defendant in Wallace had been assigned defense counsel at the trial
level who, according to the lawyer representing the defendant on appeal,
had pressured the defendant to plead guilty 290
The problems of insufficient funding and too few defenders are
compounded by the demands created by increasing case complexity 291
As prosecutors respond to the get-tough-on-those-accused-of-crime climate
of the day (especially as to drug possession and violent offenses), plea
bargaining is limited or eliminated, thereby increasing the number of cases
that must be prepared and brought to trial.292 Days devoted to a trial
mean time lost for the preparation of other cases, and the defender finds
himself with an ever-increasing backlog of work that must be done.
Prosecutors are tending also to elevate the severity of charges brought and
to increase the number of charges per complaint.293 Bail is set at higher
amounts, causing more pre-trial custody and the consequent expenditure
of counsel's time to visit the jail to meet clients. Legislatures are raising
penalties for many offenses and the practice of sentencing is becoming
increasingly complex.
294
There is perhaps no greater confirmation of the caseload problems of
public defenders than the emergence of American private industry trying
289. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
290. Id.
291. See, for example, Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770 (Ark. 1991), wherein the Arkansas Supreme
Court found the legislative limitation of fees given court-appointed counsel to be constitutionally
inadequate in light of the recent drastic rise in the complexity of criminal litigation. Prosecutors are also
affected by the additional work required per case. See Nugent & McEwen, supra note 243, at 2
(reporting that a survey of prosecutors revealed that 61% considered increased felony case complexity
to be a factor in their overall difficulties of keeping up with their caseload; increases in motions filed
per case and increases in motion hearings were cited by 60% of the prosecutors as contributing factors
to case overload).
292. Diminished plea bargaining also affects prosecutors' abilities to cope with increased caseloads.
See Nugent & McEwen, supra note 243 (finding that 38% of prosecutors surveyed concluded that an
increase in the percentage of cases going to trial contributed significantly to difficulties in handling
caseloads).
293. See Robert L. Spangenberg, We Are Still Not Defending the Poor Properly, CRIM. JUsT., Fall
1989, at 11, 11-12 (reporting a study conducted for the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics).
294. Recent Trends in Indigent Defense Services, supra note 195, at 1. In 1990, the National Institute
of Justice conducted an assessment of the needs of public defense organizations. An analysis of the
results showed that increased or mandatory sentencing and overcharging by prosecutors or police were
major causes of the caseload problems of the offices. Arango, supra note 233.
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to profit from the crisis. A mailing from U.E. Inc. of Norwalk,
Connecticut, to public defender offices knew how to make the appeal:
Attention Public Defenders and Legal Aid Society Attorneys: If you
need to improve your case tracking and productivity, U.E. Can Help!
Legal Aid Societies and Public Defenders are faced with a chronic
problem today- caseloads and services to be provided are increasing
relentlessly, but funding is not keeping pace. Attempting to reconcile
these trends puts a severe strain on an organizations' [sic] resources
and people. 95
But even private industry could not perform miracles on insufficiently
funded defender offices. U.E. Inc. has since withdrawn from even
attempting to aid defender programs.29 6
V LITIGATION STRATEGIES TO ATTACK SYSTEMIC FAILURES
Given the overwhelming caseloads of public defender offices, it might
be expected that the directors of the offices would be in the forefront of
a struggle to devise remedies for the situation. Such, unfortunately, is not
the case. This Part will examine possible office-wide responses and
attempt to explain why such actions are seldom taken.
Since the very clients whom the office is in business to represent suffer
most directly from the underfunding of defender offices, affirmative
litigation on behalf of those clients would serve a proper and potentially
vital function. The focus of that litigation could be the claim that the
defendants represented by the office are being systematically denied their
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel because of
insufficient funding of the office. When the lack of resources leads to
structural impediments that interfere with even the most able lawyer's
ability to provide proper representation, the state is failing to meet its
obligation.
The Supreme Court has never decided a case concerned with claims of
inadequacies of the system which provides defense services.297 In
295. U.E. INC., ATrENTiON PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND LEGAL AID ATTORNEYs (1988) (brochure on
file with the author).
296. Telephone interview with Ralph Hess, U.E. Inc. Director of Programs (July 17, 1991).
297. The first Supreme Court case to establish the right to counsel was Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932). That case, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required
appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant in a capital case, in some way did present a situation
wherein the process for the appointment of counsel was deemed to be inappropnate. (The trial court had
appointed "all the members of the bar" to represent the defendants at arraignment. Id. at 45.) The
Supreme Court declared "that [the] duty [to appoint counsel] is not discharged by an assignment at such
a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial
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Strickland v Washington2 98 and United States v Cronic, 299 when the
Court finally did concern itself with the proper standard of representation
to be required, the focus was on the services provided by the individual
attorney to the individual defendant. However, when the underlying cause
for the individual attorney's failings can be found in the system in which
he operates, that system itself must be scrutinized."0 Justice Blackmun,
in his dissent in Polk County v Dodson,30 1 certainly indicated an
awareness of the problem:
The county's control over the size of and funding for the public
defender's office, as well as over the number of potential clients,
effectively dictates the size of an individual attorney's caseload and
influences substantially the amount of time the attorney is able to
devote to each case. The public defender's discretion in handling
individual cases-and therefore his ability to provide effective
assistance to his clients-is circumscribed to an extent not experienced
by privately retained attorneys. a 2
The ABA Bar Information Program of the Standing Committee on Legal
Aid and Indigent Defendants funded an analysis of a sample of cases from
1970 to 1983 in which there had been findings of ineffectiveness of
counsel. This study revealed that perhaps 70% of these cases could be
identified as real or possible cases of "systemic failure in adequacy of
representation."3 3 The analysis further found that "a closer review of
these cases reveals that the errors of counsel were very frequently
occasioned by a systemic impairment or restraint which worked to unfairly
inhibit or even nullify representation by counsel, although counsel was
'bodily' in the courtroom, totally apart from counsel's personal skills or
abilities.3 a 4
Although the Supreme Court held in Gideon v Wainwrght305 that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in felony proceedings was applicable
of the case." Id. at 71 (emphasis added). It might well be argued that the systematic appointment of
counsel from a defender office which was already confronted with an excessive caseload, is a
circumstance which would indeed preclude effective aid.
298. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
299. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
300. In Cronic, the Supreme Court acknowledged that at times there are circumstances which would
make it highly unlikely that any lawyer, "even a fully competent one," could render effective assistance.
Id. at 659 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)). The Cronic court noted approvingly that
it was therefore unnecessary in Powell to examine the actual performance of counsel at trial since it was
unlikely that any lawyer, "even a fully competent one," could have provided effective assistance. Id.
301. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
302. Id. at 332 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
303. Brief of Amicus Curiae, the Nat'l Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n, the Ass'n of Trial Lawyers
of America, and the ACLU in support of Respondent, at 27 n.12, Cronic (No. 82-660).
304. Id. at 27.
305. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,3 °6 it was not specified how the states were to meet their
new burden. The Criminal Justice Act,30 7  passed by Congress
immediately after the Gideon decision, provided for remuneration in
federal cases for representation of indigents by either a legal aid agency
or by attorneys of the private bar. The states' obligations were greatly
increased by the holding of the Court in Argersinger v Hamlin30 ' that
an individual must have an attorney to assist in his defense if he is to be
incarcerated at all, even if the charge is only a misdemeanor.30 9
A. Class Action Suits
Although a short-lived success, Wallace v Kern310 was perhaps the
most significant suit on behalf of indigents claiming that the defense
delivery system was not providing effective counsel. In Wallace, a class-
action suit was brought under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 31 ' on
behalf of all felony defendants detained in the Brooklyn House of
Detention for Men. The plaintiffs were represented by the Center for
Constitutional Rights, and the defendants were the State of New York, the
City of New York, and the Legal Aid Society The plaintiffs claimed that
the heavy caseload of the attorneys in the Legal Aid Society had
prevented the rendering of effective assistance. 3 2 The federal district
306. The Gideon holding expressly overruled the Court's earlier holding in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942), that the Sixth Amendment was not applicable to the states. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342. The
right of counsel in a felony prosecution in federal court was established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938).
307. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988).
308. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
309. Id. at 37. Justice Powell's concurrng opinion recognized that the new demands for state
expenditures for counsel could well adversely affect the system. Id. at 52. Former ChiefJustice Burger's
concurrence, while recognizing the new burdens, confidently opined that "the dynamics of the profession
have a way of rising to the burdens placed upon it." Id. at 44.
310. 392 F Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. dented, 414 U.S.
1135 (1974).
311. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depnvation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
312. The court found that the Legal Aid Society represented approximately 90% of all those
incarcerated on felony charges. Wallace, 392 F Supp. at 836.
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court held extensive hearings wherein there was testimony from top Legal
Aid Society administrators, Legal Aid attorneys, private attorneys
testifying as to what they would consider to be a manageable caseload,
court personnel, and incarcerated clients of the Legal Aid Society
Testimony revealed that even though the attorney in charge of the Legal
Aid Society office admitted that no attorney could handle more than forty
cases and still cover institutional assignments such as arraignments, some
attorneys nevertheless had over ninety cases." 3 The parties stipulated
that a number of private attorneys working in the same court system as
the Legal Aid attorneys would testify that they would not try to maintain
more than twenty-five to thirty-five active cases.3" 4
In its decision, the court referred to two studies of the representation
provided by the Legal Aid Society which had recommended that maximum
caseloads be established. A commission appointed by two state appellate
divisions concluded that if Legal Aid continued to accept additional cases,
there would be "a continuation of a type of representation grossly
overburdening to the Society, and which all, including the Society's
attorneys, recognize as inadequate. '31 The second study found that:
As long as their caseloads remain at the present staggering levels, it is
impossible for Legal Aid attorneys to form productive relationships
with their clients, thoroughly investigate and prepare their cases,
counsel their clients, and take an active role in the sentencing process.
In short, an attorney with an active caseload of 100 felony cases cannot
provide effective representation to his clients.
3 6
The Wallace court concluded that "[t]he facts show that Legal Aid
attorneys have excessive caseloads and that the conditions under which
they must work are shocking."33 7 The court found that an average felony
caseload of forty cases "strains the utmost capacity of a Legal Aid
attorney under existing conditions," and that the present average caseload
was substantially in excess of that number. 318 The court then issued an
injunction prohibiting the Legal Aid Society from accepting any additional
assignments, since to do so "would prevent [the Society] from affording
its existing clients their constitutional right to counsel. '319
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 842 (quoting Report of the Subcommittee on Legal Representation of the Indigent, at 12
(June 17, 1971)).
316. Id. at 843 (quoting report by William J. vanden Heuvel, Chairman of the Board of Corrections
of the City of New York, 26 (Mar. 25, 1973)).
317. Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
318. Id. at 849.
319. Id. The injunction was to last until the average caseload of the attorneys fell to below 40 and
until the attorney in charge of the office certified that in his professional judgment the attorneys were
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Even though the justification for the court's injunction was to ensure
effective representation for the clients of the Legal Aid Society, a goal
one would expect the Legal Aid Society itself to share, the Legal Aid
Society appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeal was
made even though the union of staff attorneys had formally advised the
Legal Aid Society through a letter of grievance that "proper representation
of clients according to professional standards is impossible," and pled for
restrictions on case intake or for increases in staff.320 The staff attorneys
were in universal agreement that the district court's findings were correct
and that the relief ordered was appropriate.32 1
The strength of the lawyers' belief that a caseload limit was needed to
stop the continuation of unconstitutional representation is evidenced in the
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Association of Legal Aid Attorneys (the union
of staff lawyers) submitted to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit: "What is at stake in this suit is whether all our attorneys in
Kings County [Brooklyn] should be compelled to provide our indigent
clients with the ineffective assistance of counsel. This goes to the very
heart of the professional responsibilities of us all." '322
Some improvements in the quality of representation did occur in the
period after the district court order (and before being vacated by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals), as the Amicus Curiae Brief notes:
The District Court order has already drastically improved the
effectiveness of our representation to clients in Kings County Attorney
caseloads in the trial parts have been reduced to between 45 and 50,
and for the first time in two years, attorneys have begun to have longer
interviews and improved contact with clients, time to research and
prepare necessary motions, and to supervise investigations.323
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, while being "entirely
sympathetic with the purposes" of the district court's order, was
"constrained to reverse on the law "324 The circuit court found that the
able to give effective representation to their current and future clients. Id.
320. Brief for Amicus Curiae Association of Legal Aid Attorneys of the City of New York, at 3,
Wallace v. Kern, 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973) (No. 73-1826), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974). The
letter of grievance also stated: "[T]he typical attorney in the Brooklyn Supreme Court now carries a
caseload of more than i00 clients for which he is responsible. It is impossible for any one attorney to
represent so many defendants in an adequate manner." Id. at 8. It should be noted that the Brooklyn
Supreme Court handles felony cases exclusively.
321. Id. The association noted that in certain respects it believed the district court should have
granted further relief. Id. at 3 n.l.
322. Id. at 4.
323. Id. at 18.
324. Wallace v. Kern, 481 F.2d 621, 622 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974), and
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975).
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district court had no jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the
Legal Aid Society was a private not-for-profit institution and was not,
therefore, acting under color of state law 325 It seems not at all
persuasive to conclude that when the state is under the constitutional
obligation to provide counsel to indigents in criminal cases, and the state
meets that burden through the Criminal Defense Division of the Legal Aid
Society, which is funded 100% by the state,326 that the Legal Aid
Society is not acting under color of state law
B. Habeas Corpus Relief
In Gaines v Manson, 27 the Connecticut Public Defender Office
brought a suit on behalf of inmates alleging ineffective representation of
counsel. Assisted by the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, seven inmates
initiated the action by petitioning for writs of habeas corpus alleging
violations of their constitutional rights to timely prosecution of their
appeals. 28 In a unanimous decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court
found that the state failed to provide a sufficient number of public
defenders to effectively handle the appeals of indigent defendants. 329
The lack of adequate staffing led to delays ranging from two to four and
one-half years for the processing of the petitioners' appeals.
325. Id. The Legal Aid Lawyers Amicus Brief demonstrated that the lawyers were fully aware that
the court might find that there was no state action, and attempted to impress upon the court their
willingness to accept the burdens and responsibilities that may occur if the actions of the Legal Aid
Society were to be deemed state action: "If a finding that the Criminal Defense Division is subject to
Section 1983 jurisdiction for purposes of this suit means that it and its attorneys will be subject to suits
in the nature of malpractice, the 450 staff attorneys Amicus represents are willing to accept the risk of
litigation because our representation will be so improved that we will be able to render effective
representation." See Brief for Amicus Curiae Association of Legal Aid Attorneys of the City of New
York, at 11 nA, Wallace, 481 F.2d 621 (No. 73-1826).
326. All of the funds for the representation of indigent defendants provided by the Legal Aid Society
were from New York City. Although there were additional grants from the United States Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, that money went to the funding of special, supplemental
projects. Brief for Amicus Curiae Association of Legal Aid Attorneys of the City of New York, at 6,
Wallace, 481 F.2d 621 (No. 73-1826).
327. 481 A.2d 1084 (Conn. 1984).
328. Habeas corpus is available to individuals in state custody who allege that their confinement
violates a provision of the United States Constitution. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2254-2255 (1988) (outlining the procedural prerequisites for obtaining a writ of habeas corpus from
a federal court). Federal habeas relief is available only for violations of federal law. Smith v. Phillips,
455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982).
329. Gaines, 481 A.2d at 1088. The state argued that since the ultimate representation on the appeal
was competent, that was sufficient. The court responded: "Although we agree that our criminal justice
system is fortunate to have obtained the services of counsel as skilled and dedicated as those who serve
in the public defender's office, we cannot accept this line of reasoning. [N]o such tradeoff can
overcome an impairment of access which is as marked as these petitions manifest." Id. at 1094.
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The court emphasized equal protection concerns, noting that defendants
able to afford private counsel generally have briefs filed on their behalf
in six months or less. The court found that "[t]he difference between four
years and six months reflects a disparity in opportunity of access to the
appellate forum that is constitutionally impermissible. '3 3 However,
since this was not a suit seeking injunctive relief, as had been the case in
Wallace v Kern, the court only concerned itself with remedies for the
seven inmate-petitioners.33" ' The habeas route does not offer the
prospective relief that is needed for public defender clients who in the
future will also be "discriminate[d] against because of their
poverty "332
Habeas corpus relief,333 while providing what may be an adequate
remedy at law for the deprivation of an individual's constitutional rights
in state proceedings,3 34 is not an aid in providing the kind of systemic
change needed.33 Nor is appellate review of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, wherein any relief obtained applies only to the case before
the court. Additionally, even if the trial counsel's representation in a
given case is found to be ineffective, the Supreme Court's decision in
Strickland v Washington336 means that the conviction will be upheld
unless the defendant establishes "a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.
3 37
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that counsel may not be
appointed to assist a defendant who desires to appeal based on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court in Pennsylvania v. Finley
338
ruled that neither the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause nor the
330. Id. (citations omitted).
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1095.
333. The remedy of a court in adjudicating habeas corpus petitions will depend on the constitutional
right being vindicated. See, e.g., Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438-40 (1973) (holding that only
the extreme remedy of a dismissal of charges against the defendant lies when the constitutional right
abridged is that of a speedy trial).
334. The Supreme Court in Stricldand v. Washington stated that "[tihe principles governing
ineffectiveness claims should apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in
motions for a new trial." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984).
335. But see Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338, 1341 (Miss. 1990) (stating that claims regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel are best handled on a case by case basis); State ex. rel. Stephan v.
Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 831 (Kan. 1987) (urging that in the rare case where counsel has been ineffective,
the best solution is individual handling of the case by the appellate courts).
336. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
337. Id. at 694.
338. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
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"meaningful access" guaranteed by equal protection requires state
appointment of counsel for indigents seeking state post-conviction
relief.3 39 In the 1989 case of Murray v Giarratano,340 the Court held
that even when a person has been sentenced to death, the state is not
required to provide counsel for the state post-conviction proceeding.
34
'
Congress, however, did respond to the restrictiveness of the Murray
holding by including in the Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of
1988342 a requirement that indigents sentenced to death be appointed
counsel for all federal habeas proceedings. 43
Many of the legitimate concerns of both indigent clients and public
defenders are not of a constitutional dimension. The client whose defender
was too busy to make an appropriate application for bail review or to
speak to the defendant's family, whether to inform them of the bail
required or just to tell them of the status of the case, has no remedy based
on an appeal claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The vast majority
of cases never get appealed at all, and those appealed are rarely successful
due to the increasing limitations placed on overturning a guilty plea.
3 44
In any event, it is patently unfair to maintain that a remedy for an
incarcerated defendant who has been convicted in part due to ineffective
assistance of counsel is adequate if it may not occur until years after the
conviction.34 5
Habeas petitions and appellate review are not regulatory mechanisms for
ensuring competent representation by counsel.346 Reliance on post-
conviction relief based on the trial record is inherently flawed since any
339. Id. at 554-59.
340. 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
341. Id. at 7-12 (Rehnquist, C.J., announcing thejudgement of the Court m an opinion in which three
other Justices joined).
342. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
343. Id. § 848(q)(4)(B) (Supp. 1992).
344. The Supreme Court in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), set a new standard, one most
difficult to meet, for overturning a plea based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The
defendant must show not only that counsel was incompetent and ineffective but also that there was a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty but would
have insisted instead on going to trial. Id. at 58-60. For a fill analysis of the impact of Lockhart, see
Klein, supra note 281, at 547-52.
345. The district court judge who decided Wallace v. Kern commented: "The question at this time
is not whether any verdict or plea may be upset because of ineffectiveness of counsel, but whether the
practice of the state (and city) agencies charged with furnishing counsel meets the standards of the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. "Wallace v. Kern, 392 F Supp. 834, 844 (E.D.N.Y.
1973), rev'd, 481 F.2d 621, 622 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
346. Recent substantial incursions by the Supreme Court on the availability of habeas corpus relief
have further reduced the legitimacy of reliance on collateral attack to remedy the problems of ineffective
assistance.
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record of a trial in which counsel was ineffective is likely to be
incomplete and not truly indicative of all that could have been done by a
competent attorney 3" Not all courts, however, share the view that direct
appeals and habeas petitions do not provide meaningful relief. For
example, when a civil rights action was brought against a county in
Indiana alleging that the county was providing indigent defendants with
constitutionally deficient representation, the court granted the county's
motion for summary judgment. 34" The court claimed that the plaintiffs'
allegations could be raised more appropriately in individual cases through
post-conviction appeal or via a writ of habeas corpus.34 9
One court struck a sort of middle ground between accepting jurisdiction
of a section 1983 civil rights claim and holding that the habeas corpus
remedy was sufficient in and of itself. In Hadley v. Werner,35 0 an inmate
brought a section 1983 suit alleging that the fee schedule in a Michigan
county designed to compensate appointed counsel was inadequate and
proximately caused the ineffective assistance which resulted. The plaintiff
claimed that only the least experienced and least capable attorneys in the
county were attracted to indigent representation because of the low fees
and that even those lawyers were unwilling to devote the requisite time
to their clients' cases.3 1' The defendants-the county, the county district
court, the county board of commissioners, the county treasurer, and the
State of Michigan-were all alleged to have known that the inadequate
fees were depriving Hadley and other indigent defendants of their
constitutional rights.3 52 The Sixth Circuit, while vacating the district
court ruling that Hadley had failed to state a proper cause of action,
nevertheless dismissed the claim, but did so without prejudice in order to
provide an opportunity for Hadley to refile if he could establish through
a habeas corpus petition that he was denied effective assistance.3 3
347. "The insidiousness of overburdening defense counsel is that it can result in concealing from the
courts, and particularly the appellate courts, the nature and extent of damage that is done to defendants
by their attorneys' excessive caseloads." State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Ariz. 1984); see also
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 41 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurrng) (noting that an appeal from
a conviction resulting from an uncounseled trial is of little help to the defendant since "the die is usually
cast" when the judgment is initially entered).
348. Noe v. County of Lake, Ind., 468 F Supp. 50 (N.D. Ind. 1978).
349. Id. at 53-54.
350. 753 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1985).
351. Id. at 515.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 516.
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C. Injunctive Relief
A suit that was not at all helpful in furthering the Sixth Amendment
rights of the indigent was Gardner v. Luckey. s4 In Gardner, convicted
and incarcerated persons brought a section 1983 civil rights action seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against public defender offices in two
judicial circuits in Florida. The plaintiffs claimed that the defenders'
representation did not meet minimal, constitutionally mandated standards
in that the lawyers failed to timely consult with their clients, failed to
advise them of the broad range of their legal rights, and failed to provide
adequate investigation into factual and legal defenses. 3" The suit sought
to enjoin the public defender offices from further representation until
minimum standards of effectiveness were met, and rested on the premise
that inadequate funding had led to excessive caseloads which created the
problems. 35 6 The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed: "[W]e hold that appellants cannot get into federal court
to make their sweeping challenge to the operation of the Florida Public
Defender Offices. 3 7 The court ruled that past exposure to illegal
conduct does not show a present case or controversy, and that each
plaintiff individually could challenge their incarceration through a habeas
corpus petition.3"
The Second Circuit in Wallace v. Kern had expressed no such concerns,
yet the Wallace plaintiffs ultimately lost because the court found no state
action. In Gardner, the plaintiffs still failed even though there clearly was
state action, given that the counsel involved were governmental
employees. There was, however, greater success in Alabama. In Tucker v
354. 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974).
355. Id. at 713.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 715. Increasingly, plaintiffs are litigating their civil rights claims in state courts, alleging
that their rights under the state constitution are being violated. This avenue may prove fruitful for
indigent defendants because virtually all state constitutions guarantee assistance of counsel. See, e.g.,
Gaines v. Manson, 481 A.2d 1084, 1095 n.15 (Conn. 1984); ARiz. CoNsT. art. II, § 24 ("the right to
appear and defend in person, and by counsel"); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14 ("the defendant's right to
counsel'); IND. CONST. art. I, § 13 ("the right to be heard by himself and counsel'); LA. CONST.
art. I, § 13 ("entitled to assistance of counsel appointed by the court if he is indigent and charged
with an offense punishable by imprisonment"); MD. CONST. declaration of rights art. XXI ("a right
to be allowed counsel"); W. VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 14 ("shall have the assistance of counsel"). Only
Virginia lacks an explicit constitutionally guaranteed right to the assistance of counsel, and the Virginia
courts have construed the state constitution's due process clause, VA. CONST. art. I § 8, to provide for
one. Morrs v. Smyth, 120 S.E.2d 465,466 (Va. 1961); Sargent v. Commonwealth, 360 S.E.2d 895, 896
(Va. App. 1987).
358. Gardner, 500 F.2d at 714-15.
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City of Montgomery Board of Commissioners,3 5 9 individuals convicted
of misdemeanors brought suit in the federal district court alleging that
counsel was not being provided as required by Argersinger v Hamlin.260
The court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction prohibiting
the municipal court from continuing the policy whereby the Argersinger
requirement of prompt and effective counsel was not being met. 36' The
court ordered the mayor of Montgomery to file a plan within thirty days
specifying the means and methods to be used for furnishing counsel so as
to meet constitutional requirements. 6 2
Corenevsky v Superior Court,163 although dealing with somewhat
different concerns, did show state court sympathy for the plight of
defendants in counties desiring to spend as little money as possible in
providing representation. The trial court had ordered the auditor of
Imperial County, California, to allocate payment for four expert defense
witnesses. Although the county claimed that the expense of $13,314 would
"bankrupt" the county, 364 the trial court held the auditor in contempt for
refusing to make the payment.3 65 The California Supreme Court upheld
the contempt order: "To hold otherwise would be to encourage and
facilitate local government intrusion into exclusive powers of the
judiciary [I]t is solely a judicial question whether a given defendant
shall be afforded requested defense -ervices. 36 6 The court, in language
helpful for developing litigation strategies to challenge underfunding of
public defender offices, emphatically rejected the concept of balancing the
need for legal services against the other needs of the county "Such a rule
would pose serious problems of equal protection: it would directly
condition a defendant's right to ancillary services, and hence effectiveness
of counsel, on the fisc of the county in which he is being prosecuted."3 67
359. 410 F Supp. 494 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
360. 407 U.S. 25, 34-40 (1972). The Supreme Court noted in Argersnger that misdemeanants
especially, because of the sheer volume of cases which must be handled, are at risk of the courts'
imposition of "'assembly-line justice."' Id. at 36. For this reason, the Court held that "absent a knowing
and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at is trial." Id. at 37.
361. Tucker, 410 F Supp. at 507.
362. Id. The court noted that the mayor was the object of the order because the mayor approved
municipal court policies regarding expenditures and was therefore responsible for the policies that were
not in compliance with Argersinger Id. at 508-09.
363. 682 P.2d 360 (Cal. 1984).
364. Id. at 363-64. One county in Arizona refused outright to pay any costs associated with the
defense of twenty members of an all-black church. The judge dismissed the case. Arizona Judge Calls
OffTrial of20 Blacks, N.Y. TIMes, Feb. 16, 1984, at A18.
365. Corenevsky, 682 P.2d at 364-65.
366. Id. at 371.
367. Id. at 367 n.13.
[Vol. 68:363
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
D Action by the Public Defender
Litigation brought by the public defender office itself has been
extremely rare.368 Defenders are typically county or state employees, and
the chief defender, who would have to approve any litigation, is in almost
all instances beholden to the government for his continued
employment.369 The county officials who would be the object of the
litigation are typically the same individuals responsible for setting the
defender's salary370 and determining the annual budget for the program.
Political control of defender offices continues in spite of the ABA
standards warning against such control37' and specifically prohibiting
retaliation against "professional judgments made in the proper
performance of defense services. '"372 The U.S. Supreme Court in Polk
County v. Dobson373 similarly concluded, "it is the Constitutional
obligation of the State to respect the professional independence of the
public defenders whom it engages.
The defender office, however, would be in the most advantageous
position to conduct the litigation.375 Statistics showing staff caseloads
368. This is true even though county executives themselves are aware of their vulnerability to such
litigation. For example, the chairman of the Fulton County (Atlanta) Commission recently admitted after
a series of news stones highlighting the excessive caseload of defenders which had resulted from
inadequate funding: "I think we have tremendous exposure with respect to the defense issue." Renaud
& Woolner, supra note 48, at 2.
369. See. e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27703 (West 1988) (permitting the county board of supervisors
to terminate "at its will" the appointment of any chief public defender); cf STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE Standard 5-4.1 (A.B.A. 1990) ("Neither the chief defender nor staff should be removed except
upon a showing of good cause.').
370. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27711 (West 1988).
371. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 5-1.3(a) (A.B.A. 1990). The Standards suggest
a board of trustees to govern defender offices as a means of securing political independence. Id.
Standard 5-1.3(b).
372. Id. Standard 5-1.6.
373. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
374. Id. at 321-22. The failure of states to honor this mandate can be noted by the perceived need
of the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy in 1992 to recommend that Kentucky state laws be
amended so as to ensure "professional and political independence" of the public defender services.
Edward C. Monahan, Indigent Defense Needs Revising, THE ADVOCATE (Ky. Dep't of Pub. Advoc.),
Feb. 1992, at 5. The Department of Public Advocacy previously recommended such statutory revision
in 1991 and in 1988. Id. at 8.
375. Support for such litigation comes from a new Standard for Cnminal Justice. Standard 5-5.4 is
titled Impact Litigation and reads as follows:
(a) The legal representation plan should permit pursuit of litigation which affects:
(i) substantial numbers of similarly situated clients of the program, or
(ii) fundamental rights which cannot otherwise be effectively protected.
(b) Any such litigation should be undertaken only when it is in the best interests of the
affected clients.
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and the amount of time an attorney was actually able to devote to each
case would be readily available to defender offices. The chief defender
could permit and even encourage the staff and supervisors to testify,
office investigators could show how budget limitations curtail their
abilities to perform thorough work for all defenders who need it, and
secretaries could testify that because the office is so understaffed, motions
and briefs may not be completed and filed on time.
Perhaps most significantly, any defender office seeing a need for
litigation to attack the adequacy and viability of the system which
provides defense services could plan ahead and prepare for the suit.
Documentation could be provided for every case each lawyer had, showing
the time the lawyer was able to devote to preparing the case both in court
and out: motions prepared, bail applications filed, hearings conducted,
research done, time needed to consult with the defendant and his or her
family, investigations conducted, and witnesses interviewed. Careful
records could be kept of budget requests and denials, and techniques could
be developed for projecting estimated caseloads, including details such as
expected duration and work required for each type of offense charged.
Defenders could get support for their litigation from chapter five of the
ABA's Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice,
entitled "Providing Defense Services."37 6 The standards advise defender
organizations not to accept workloads that "by reason of their excessive
size, interfere with the rendering of quality representation or lead to the
breach of professional obligations." '377 The standards instruct defenders
that if accepting any new cases or continuing representation on all
pending cases would lead to ineffective representation, the defender "must
take such steps as may be appropriate to reduce their pending or projected
caseloads, including the refusal of further appointments. 3 78
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 5.4 (A.B.A. 1990). The discussion supporting the ABA
Section on Criminal Justice's recommendation to the ABA House of Delegates to adopt this Standard,
stated that "it was felt that the standards should explicitly address this issue [impact litigation], given
the political pressures which may come to bear on a program when it undertakes anything more than
the defense of individual defendants." A.B.A. Section of Cnm. Just., Report to the House of Delegates,
Recommendation 17 (Aug. 1990).
376. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (A.B.A. 1990).
377. Id. Standard 5.3; see also STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES Standard Three (Wash.
Defenders Ass'n 1989) (recommending that defender organizations should not accept workloads which
are so excessive as to interfere with quality representation); STANDARDS FOR DEFENDER SERVICES
Standard IV-1 (Nat'l Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n).
378. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 5-5.3 (A.B.A. 1990) (emphasis added); see also
GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, FINAL REPORT 517 (Nat'l Study
Comm'n on Defense Servs. 1976) (stating that when a defender system is faced with an excessive
caseload, it should pursue all viable means of alleviating the problem, including initiating legal causes
of action).
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While the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals37 9 does not require litigation by the public defender office
confronted with excessive caseloads, it does provide the defender with the
following instruction:
If the public defender determines that because of excessive workload
the assumption of additional cases or continued representation in
previously accepted cases by his office might reasonably be expected
to lead to inadequate representation in cases handled by him, he should
bring this to the attention of the court. If the court accepts such
assertions, the court should direct the public defender to refuse to
accept or retain additional cases for representation by his office.380
One litigation theory that might prove successful in attempting to get
state courts to order additional funding for defender offices is that the
inadequate representation provided by the defenders impacts negatively
upon the proper functioning of the courts themselves. In Wilson v
State,38' when the Mississippi Supreme Court was confronted with a
challenge to the legislatively enacted reimbursement schedule for court-
appointed lawyers, it adopted this analysis. The court concluded that the
$1,000 maximum permitted per case was so low as to impact on the courts
and to potentially emasculate the constitutional mandate for the separation
of powers. 8 2 Without ever specifically enumerating the connection
between inadequate reimbursement for counsel and its impact on the
functioning of the court as a co-equal of the legislature, the court assumed
such a relationship.8 3 The court concluded:
If the legislative branch fails in its constitutional mandate to furnish
the absolute essentials required for the operation of an independent and
effective court, then no court affected thereby should fail to act. It is
the absolute duty of a court in such latter circumstances to act, and act
promptly.
38 4
The concerns of chief defenders about repercussions from the county as
a result of the office taking actions that might lead to the county being
sued, criticized, or mandated to spend more funds are not merely
379. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON COURTS(1973) (project of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration).
380. Id. Standard 13.12 ("Workload of Public Defenders") (emphasis added).
381. 574 So. 2d 1338 (Miss. 1990).
382. The court refused to find the reimbursement statute unconstitutional on either grounds that the
low fee constituted an unlawful taking of property or that defendants with such low-paid counsel were
denied the equal protection of the laws. Id. at 1340-41.
383. In a concurring opinion, Justice Robertson commented that: "If an adequate courthouse is
essential to the administration of justice, so are competent counsel." Id. at 1342 (Robertson, J.,
concurrmng).
384. Id. at 1340 (emphasis added).
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imaginary The Los Angeles County Public Defender Office commenced
three suits: (1) an action to prohibit the Los Angeles County Sheriff
Department from reading mail between inmates and their attorneys, (2) a
class action suit in federal district court challenging a system of jury
selection, and (3) litigation to prevent pre-trial detention of juveniles in
state reformatories or correctional institutions. 385 Board members of the
Los Angeles County Board of Superiors publicly criticized the defender
office for instituting the litigation without consulting the Board. The
Board proceeded to conduct an audit-management study of the defender
office, which resulted in strong criticism of the office's management
policies and recommendations that the office desist from filing injunctions
or class actions. After the Board withheld approval of any salary increase,
the chief public defender resigned. 86 The staff defenders were in
agreement that the Board had prompted the resignation in direct retaliation
for the litigation.3"7
To some extent, the more effectively public defenders accomplish their
proper functions, the more antagonism they may engender, and efforts to
limit their work and goals may increase. The agencies the defender may
be opposing-the police, prosecution, probation, parole, or corrections
department-all have the support of the politicians and the public who
want, above all, more effective crime control.
One suit that sought relief similar to that obtained in Wallace v
Kern'" was intiated by the Colorado State Public Defender. The
defender was the beneficiary of a unique situation because the Colorado
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals had empowered the
State Public Defender to determine and establish the maximum workload
for the attorneys in his office. 8 9 The workload standard adopted was the
nationally accepted one of 150 felonies per attorney per year,390 but the
385. See Brenda H. Bohne, The Public Defender as Policy-Maker, 62 JUDICATURE 176, 178-79
(1978).
386. ld. at 180.
387. Id. at 181. The Los Angeles County Bar Association formed a committee to study the matter
and concluded that: (a) litigation by the office ought not to be restricted, (b) there might well be a duty
of the defender to file lawsuits on behalf of his clients, and (c) the defender office ought not be
compromised because it was a public agency. Id.
388. 371 F Supp. 1384 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), revd, 499 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1135 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 310-26
and accompanying text.
389. Since the complaint terminated with a Stipulation of Dismissal, the case has not been officially
reported. A copy of the complaint, supporting memoranda, and exhibits can be found in NANCY
ALBERT-GOLDBERG, PERSPECTIVES RELATING TO CASE OVERLOAD IN DEFENDER OFFICES app. B
(1981).
390. Id.
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average caseload in the office far exceeded that number. Because the
caseload of attorneys in the defender office exceeded the permissible
maximum, the defender proceeded to file a complaint seeking an
injunction against the district and county judges which would prohibit the
judges from appointing the defender office as counsel for any additional
individuals.39 '
The Colorado State Public Defender had previously sought to alleviate
the caseload problems by obtaining an increase in funds from the
legislature, but the funding which was finally allocated for the next year
would have resulted in the actual elimination of three lawyers from the
office.392 The complaint alleged that the excessive caseload prohibited
the office from providing effective assistance of counsel and, therefore,
the attorneys in the office were in jeopardy of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility One deputy defender had been cited for
contempt of court for refusing to accept a new appointment, and the
complaint stated that other deputies "must and will move to withdraw
from certain cases, and they must and will decline new appointments, both
at the trial level and on appeal. 393
The matter terminated in a stipulation of dismissal, granting to a
significant extent what had been sought by the public defender office. The
defendant-judges ceased to appoint the defender office in a number of
cases, and permitted withdrawal in others. The stipulation stated: "The
effect of this action has been to reduce the caseloads of the Plaintiffs
herein to the maximum caseload standards sought by Plaintiffs."'3 94
While the defenders were paid by the state, the counties exclusively bore
the expense of appointed counsel who were taking the place of the public
defenders. The counties then proceeded to successfully pressure the
legislature to fund additional positions for the state defender system. 9 '
The Colorado court's support for the public defender does have
reinforcement from the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice.396 In
1990, the ABA House of Delegates approved a one-sentence addition to
the "Workload" Standard of chapter five. The new standard instructs:
391. Id.
392. Id. at Exhibit A. If court appointments of the defender's office continued at the then-current rate,
the effect of the decrease in staff would have been to increase caseloads to approximately 215 cases per
attorney in the next fiscal year. Id. at app. B(4)(2).
393. Id. at app. B(l)(4) (Complaint for Declaration Judgment and Injunctive Relief).
394. Id. at app. B(5) (Stipulation of Dismissal). Furthermore, there was an acknowledgment by the
defendants that the 150 felony standard for each attorney was appropriate and reasonable.
395. Id. at 28.
396. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JuSmICE (A.B.A. 1990).
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"Courts should not require individuals or programs to accept workloads
that will lead to the furnishing of representation lacking in quality or to
the breach of professional obligations. 397
In Florida, two circuit public defender offices confronted with excessive
caseloads filed motions to withdraw from certain assignments, claiming
inability to provide effective assistance of counsel. In one of the cases,
State ex reL Escambia County v Behr,39 the Florida District Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit approved the trial court's decision granting
the motion to withdraw ... In Dade County v. Baker,0 0 the Third
District Court of Appeals noted that the First District's Behr decision was
"on point, 40 ' but declined to adhere to that ruling and held that the
defender office could not withdraw 402 With the two appellate districts
in conflict, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the Behr decision permitting
withdrawal by the defender.0 3 The independent action taken by the
Florida defenders, antagonizing the county officials who must appropriate
397. Id. Standard 5-5.3. The Discussion section supporting this addition to the Standards was
presented to the House of Delegates in its August, 1990, meeting. It stated that "[i]t was felt that the
addition was necessary to point out that the problem of excessive caseload is as frequently an issue of
pressure from the courts as it is a reluctant willingness by public defenders to accept them." A.B.A.
Section of Criminal Justice, Report to the House of Delegates, Recommendation 16 (Aug. 1990).
398. 354 So. 2d 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), afTfd, 384 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1980).
399. The county sought a writ of mandamus to compel the public defender to represent the
defendants on the cases from which he was seeking to withdraw. Behr, 354 So. 2d at 975. The court
held that it would be improper "to mandate the appointment of the public defender if so doing would
compromise the effectiveness of his representation. 'Both ethical considerations and professional
standards dictate otherwise." Id. at 976.
400. 362 So. 2d 151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
401. Id. at 152. The court added: "[We decline to follow the holding of our sister court in its broad
application of the law." Id. at 154.
402. The public defender office had sought to withdraw from all noncapital felony appeals "as a
temporary stop gap measure to avoid further delays and dismissals of appeals which must presently be
prosecuted." Id. When the filings of appeals are being delayed, it may be that defendants remain
incarcerated merely because of the limited resources available to the counsel responsible for conducting
the appeal.
403. Escambia County v. Behr, 384 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1980). The Oregon Supreme Court took a
similar approach. Acocella v. Allen, 604 P.2d 391 (Or. 1979) (filing of petitions by public defender
office and nine indigent defendants to have appellate counsel other than the public defender office
assigned because there was insufficient staff to adequately represent all the appeals). The circuit court
judge refused to allow the defender office to decline appointment, but the Oregon Supreme Court, in
a decision criticizing the circuit judge for caring only about saving taxpayers' funds, ordered a writ
commanding the presiding circuit judge to appoint counsel other than the public defender office.
The New York City Legal Aid Society also found itself with more appeals than it could handle, and
the Legal Aid Society's executive director petitioned the city's two appellate divisions for an 18-month
moratorium on the assignment of new appeals to Legal Aid. The Legal Aid Society had 1,800 cases
pending at the time. The appellate division judges agreed to send letters to bar associations and law
firms requesting volunteers to assist with the backlog. Martin Fox, Ruling Emphaszes Backlog of
Appeals by Legal Aid, N.Y L.J., Feb. 23, 1984, at 1.
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the extra cost of appointed private counsel to replace the public
defenders," 4 was possible in part because public defenders in Florida
are elected40 5 and therefore not dependent on county officials for the
retention of their positions.4 6
In any such litigation conducted by a defender office, it is most helpful
if the statutory scheme which provides for the delivery of defense services
for indigents includes provisions for the appointment of private counsel
as well as public defenders. A court judging the effectiveness of an
overburdened defender agency must have available to it the option of
court-appointed counsel to represent those defendants who would normally
be clients of the defenders but who, if assigned to a public defender,
would just exacerbate the problems currently confronting the already
overloaded defender system.40 7 Virtually all defense services systems,
whether providing for representation in state40 1 or federal 4 9 courts,
have such provisions.410
One very real obstacle to successful litigation is the resistance of courts
to become involved, compounded by insensitivity to the severity of the
problem. The New Jersey Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Madden v.
Township of Delran41 1 exemplifies judicial obstinacy and indifference.
The issue presented in Madden was whether the failure of municipalities
throughout the state to compensate counsel who were appointed to
represent indigent defendants was permissible. The court admitted that the
404. In both of these Florida cases, it was the county that appealed the initial trial court decision
permitting defender withdrawal.
405. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 18; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.50 (West 1988).
406. By 1990, overwhelmng caseloads had once again created a crisis. The Dade County Public
Defender stated that staff defenders simply could not handle their caseloads in a "timely and professional
manner." Caseloads per year in Miami and Tallahassee have approached 1,200 per attorney. Florida
Public Defenders Call for Restructurng of Indigent Defense Funding, supra note 244, at 3.
407. The court then could give the county the clear choice of increasing funding for the defender
office or expending funds for court-appointed counsel. See Ligda v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 3d 811,
827-28 (1970) (stating that a defender confronted with a staggering workload should inform the court
which can then order pnvate counsel to be appointed).
408. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38, 208-10(c)(I) (1973) (stating that the state appellate defender
may maintain a list of lawyers to be called upon on a case-by-case basis); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2702
(1992) (stating that at least 40% of all indigent defendants must receive court-appointed, not public
defender, counsel).
409. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1988) (stating that localities providing for representation of indigent
defendants m federal cases must provide for private counsel to be appointed in a "substantial portion
of cases").
410. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 5-1.2 (A.B.A. 1990). Standard 5-1.2 suggests
that a plan for representation of indigent defendants should be based on the services of both a full-time
public defender and an assigned counsel system involving the private bar. Id.
411. 601 A.2d 211 (NJ. 1992).
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low quality of advocacy provided by conscripted attorneys having no
desire to represent indigent clients, especially when no fee was provided,
was "unfair to indigent defendants who suffer with unequal justice."4 '2
The Madden court found the system which so short changed the
indigent-accused to be "most unsatisfactory," yet one which did not call
for "statewide action by this Court. 41 3 Although the court realized it
"cannot forever accept a system so clearly inefficient, historically unfair,
and potentially unconstitutional, 41 4 it could accept the system for now
The court seemed blind to the financial realities confronting the
economically troubled, recession-impacted state when it held, "[w]e stay
our hand only because we believe other branches of government, state,
county and local, are equally able to address the problem, equally
committed to meeting the constitutional obligation, and equally concerned
with the unfairness that inevitability affects the present system. 4t 5
That this court had such faith in the New Jersey local and state
governments was all the more mind boggling in light of the action taken
by a major New Jersey locality just prior to this court's decision. Since
1973, Jersey City had had a public defender system, yet the city decided
to eliminate the program41 6 and act in just the way that the state
supreme court was to find constitutional in Madden. After all, why pay for
defenders when the city could just assign lawyers to provide that
representation at no cost to the city" The court, instead of focusing on the
devastating impact likely to result from destroying the public defender
program, found that, "for Jersey City, the financial gain may be
needed.417 Lip service, however, was given to Sixth Amendment
concerns when the court acknowledged that "[e]limination of [the public
defender] office will severely damage the efficiency of its municipal court
412. Id. at 213.
413. Id. The court reasoned, in part, that if the court did order municipalities to compensate counsel,
there would be undesirable and "inevitable confrontation" between the two branches of government. Id.
at 212.
414. Id. at 213.
415. Id. The court did require that the assignment of counsel without compensatibn be fairly
distributed among all attorneys and that the assignment of counsel proceed alphabetically from a list that
includes every attorney licensed in the state whose primary office is in that locality. Id. at 218. While
the court did realize that some attorneys with no criminal law experience at all would now be assigned
cases, it found that to be of no great concern, even while acknowledging that "[w]e have lived with that
system in many counties for some time. [W]e have no doubt that on occasion their inexperience has
affected their representation." Id. at 219 (emphasis added).
416. Id.
417. Id. at 220. The court realized that representation provided by public defenders or paid counsel
was "far superior to that which appointed counsel may offer, but such a conclusion does not equate with
a constitutional denial of counsel." Id. at 215.
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and impair the constitutional rights of its indigent defendants."4 ' The
New Jersey Supreme Court decided to tolerate impairment of
constitutional rights in the name of saving money
In early 1992, a very interesting example of court initiative occurred in
Tennessee. The Tennessee District Public Defenders Conference
determined that the average public defender in Tennessee carried 430
cases.4 19 The judges in the Knoxville General Sessions Court reacted to
what they deemed a "crisis," and issued a decree mandating all of the
state-licensed lawyers who reside in Knoxville to be ready to accept
appointment to represent indigent defendants. The judges' order stated:
"No lawyer will be excused for any of the following reasons: a) does not
accept appointed cases; b) does not practice criminal law; c) is too
busy "420
Another extraordinary example of court intervention and concern is
demonstrated by the Arizona Supreme Court's action in State v
Smith.42 1 Defendant Smith appealed his burglary and assault convictions,
claiming, in part, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
because of his attorney's "shocking, staggering and unworkable"
caseload.4 22 The Arizona court concluded that, in order to fully
determine the issue of competency of counsel, it would be necessary to
expand the record. Therefore, the court invited the filing of amici briefs
relating to the issue of whether the system of providing counsel to
indigents in Mohave County 423 resulted in counsel being so overworked
as to endanger the defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.424
418. Id. at 220.
419. Margolick, supra note 170, at B16.
420. Id. The order provided only three valid excuses: illness, retirement, or death. Even the Knoxville
mayor, who had not practiced law for years and had never handled a criminal case, was not exempt
from the decree and was assigned the case of a defendant charged with trespass. Id.
421. 681 P.2d 1374 (Arz. 1984) (en banc). One extraordinary aspect of the'case involved the court's
sua sponte consideration of appropriate prospective relief for future defendants. Nothing in the record
indicates that defendant Smith had ever raised this issue.
422. Id. at 1378-79.
423. The defense delivery system in the county was one best characterized as the low-bid-wms-the-
contract-to-represent-the-indigent-defendants system. The court described the procedures as follows:
In May of each year a bid letter goes out from the presiding judge of Mohave County to all
attorneys in the county. It calls for sealed bids. No limitation is suggested on caseload or
hours, nor is there any criteria for evaluating ability or experience of potential applicants. The
successful bidders are assigned all indigent criminal cases in the superior courts, . all appeals
in Mohave County, and all mental evaluations No suggestion is made that counsel may
expect assistance in any way for support personnel. Any investigator, paralegal, secretary, or
similar personnel must be provided by the individual bidder who must also provide his own
office space, equipment and supplies.
Id. at 1379.
424. Id. at 1376.
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The National Legal Aid and Defender Association, the State Bar of
Arizona, and several county public defender offices submitted amici
briefs. The court's decision was most interesting and significant. Although
finding that in this specific case the counsel's representation was not
shown to be ineffective, the court did deem the attorney's caseload
"excessive, if not crushing" '425 and found that the system for providing
counsel for indigents "militates against adequate assistance."426 Smith's
counsel had, in addition to 160 misdemeanor clients, 21 juvenile cases and
149 felony clients.427 The court stated:
The fact that one felony defendant out of 149 felony defendants was
given minimum adequate representation does not mean that others were
properly represented. The insidiousness of overburdening defense
counsel is that it can result in concealing from the courts, and
particularly the appellate courts, the nature and extent of damage that
is done to defendants by their attorneys' excessive caseloads.
42
The court concluded that the county's procedures violated defendants'
rights to counsel and to due process found in the United States and
Arizona Constitutions. 42 9 The decision relied on the finding that
attorneys so overburdened cannot be reasonably effective nor can they
adequately and properly represent all clients. 43' The remedy offered,
however, was not as sweeping as might have been hoped for or expected.
The court merely ruled that as long as the county's procedures continued,
a rebuttable presumption of ineffectiveness would exist for all subsequent
appeals claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.43'
Defenders, nevertheless, ought to be heartened by the Smith decision and
realize that routine appeals on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds
may offer opportunities for showing that inadequate funding is
constitutionally impermissible. As Smith demostrated, support from state
and local bar associations is helpful and may insulate defender offices
from retaliation by funding sources.432
In 1991, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Lavit v Brady433 took the
unsolicited initiative to express concerns that were somewhat similar to
425. Id. at 1380.
426. Id. at 1381.
427. Id. at 1380.
428. Id. at 1381.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 1384.
432. See supra notes 314-16 and accompanying text.
433. Nos. 89-CA-2360-MR, 90-CA-1302-MR, 1991 WL 228037 (Ky. App. Nov. 8, 1991).
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those of the Smith court. However, the court offered no remedy or plan of
action. In the Kentucky case, the only issue presented to the court was
whether counsel in a death penalty case were entitled to be paid for all
hours worked even though the amount due would exceed by 350% the
statutory maximum of $1,250. 43 4  The applicable Kentucky statute
provided for $35 per hour for in-court work and $25 per hour for out-of-
court work. The court of appeals commented: "While the statutory hourly
rates are not in question on appeal, it behooves us to comment that the
sums are not commensurate with professional services of the kind
demanded by the nature of a capital murder case. '43 ' The court went on
to comment that the state may not be fulfilling its constitutional
obligations due, among other problems, to the lack of adequate funding
for indigent defense services.4 36
Class action suits on behalf of inmates alleging violations of their
constitutional rights might provide a model for a suit on behalf of indigent
defendants. Successful suits for prisoners have been brought when the
claim involved systematic detention absent any judicial determination of
probable cause,437 denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial,43 8
and prison conditions allegedly constituting cruel and unusual punishment.
Indeed, the language of the federal district court in Holt v Sarver,439
considering Arkansas's claim that it had insufficient funds to remedy
prison conditions, would seem to apply to a system providing for
representation of indigent defendants which does not meet the
constitutional requirements of effective assistance:
Let there be no mistake in the matter; the obligation of the
Respondents to eliminate existing unconstitutionalities does not depend
434. Id. at *I.
435. Id. at *2.
436. Id. at *6. One judge, while concurring in the result, filed a separate opinion stating: "This court
should refrain from giving advisory opinions as to constitutional questions not before us and from
suggesting legal strategy to be used in a possible future lawsuit." Id. (Wilhoit, J., concurring). But even
this judge sounded an alarm, warning that the inadequate funding problem "needs prompt attention lest
a full-blown crisis develops in criminal prosecution." Id. at *7.
437. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (invalidating arrests without a warrant and incarceration
absent probable cause on constitutional grounds). The Court in Gerstein issued its ruling even though
the claims of the named plaintiffs in the suit had become moot. The Court noted, "Pretrial detention is
by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim
decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted. [I]t is certain that other persons similarly
situated will be detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures." Id. at 110 n.1 1.
438. Wallace v. Kern, 371 F Supp. 1384, 1385 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (granting preliminary injunctive
relief to plaintiff class), revd, 499 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974). The
federal district court judge found the federal courts to have proper jurisdiction because "[tfhe hostility
of New York State courts to class actions make it impossible to obtain effective state relief where a
large number of prisoners are suffering similar loss of rights." Id. at 1390.
439. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), afifd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
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upon what the Legislature may do, or upon what the Governor may do,
or, indeed, upon what Respondents may actually be able to accomplish.
If Arkansas is going to operate a Penitentiary System, it is going to
have to be a system that is countenanced by the Constitution of the
United States.44°
Litigation concerning the desegregation of schools also illustrates the
willingness of courts to intervene when the administration of a
governmental function has been found to operate in violation of the
constitutional rights of some citizens. The failure of states to properly
implement the Gideon and Argersinger mandates 441 may be analogous
to the failure of some states to effectuate the constitutional requirement
not to discriminate against public school children on the basis of their
race.
The Supreme Court in Brown v Board of Education442 first mandated
that the states eliminate racially separate public schools. The following
year, in Brown v Board of Education (Brown 11),441 the Court noted
that, whereas school authorities have the primary responsibility for
complying with the mandate, the "courts will have to consider whether the
action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the
governing constitutional principles. 444  But compliance was not
forthcoming, and the Court in Griffin v School Board44' and Green v
County School Board446 required that the school boards remedy the
constitutional violations forthwith.
By 1970, the Court, exasperated by the "failure of local authorities to
meet their constitutional obligations, '447 granted certiorari in Swann v
Board of Education448 to "review important issues as to the duties of
school authorities and the scope of powers of federal courts under this
440. Id. at 385; see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294,
299 (Ky. 1972) (stating that it is the responsibility of the legislature to appropriate sufficient funds to
enforce the laws it has enacted). The litigation for a structural injunction to bring about institutional
reform in Arkansas prisons lasted for more than ten years. See OWEN M. Fiss & Douc RENDLEMAN,
INJUNcTIONS 529-752 (2d. ed. 1984).
441. See supra notes 305 & 308 and accompanying text.
442. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
443. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
444. Id. at 299. Such judicial vigilance and concern in watching over the counties or states charged
with meeting constitutional requirements for effective assistance to indigent defendants would be
welcome news indeed. In some criminal justice matters, the federal courts have shown awareness of
their responsibilities. See, e.g., United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 203 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding it
the duty of the court of appeals to exercise a supervisory role over the administration of criminal justice
in the circuit).
445. 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
446. 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
447. Swanm v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14 (1970).
448. Id.
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Court's mandates ,,449 The Court proceeded to clearly support the
active intervention of the federal courts when authorities have failed to
comply with their affirmative obligations: "Once a right and a violation
have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to
remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in
equitable remedies.1450 The Court added that in cases involving the
framing of remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right, "[t]he
task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests,
the condition that offends the Constitution.
451
The failure of states to deliver defense services which actually do
provide for the mandated effective assistance of counsel 4 2 involves "a
right and a violation" requiring equitable remedies.4 53 Continuing and
long-standing governmental failures call for litigation against those
entities which refuse to meet their responsibility to ensure to indigents
their constitutional right to effective counsel.
CONCLUSION
Problems created by the chronic underfunding of the defense services
system impact not only the defendant deprived of his or her Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel, but also court-appointed attorneys
and public defenders. Defense counsel for the indigent should no longer
449. Id. at 5.
450. Id. at 15.
451. Id. at 16; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57 (1990) (recognizing federal jucicial
power to mandate local governments to increase taxes in order to fulfill the requirements the
Constitution has imposed on them).
452. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides that an accused is entitled "to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The Supreme Court in Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), held that the Sixth Amendment required the appointment of counsel for
an indigent in federal proceedings, and in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court held the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause obliged the state to appoint counsel for an indigent in a
capital case. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court, through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to defendants charged
with serious offenses in state courts. The Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972),
recognized the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of any accused confronted with the loss of liberty.
The Court first specified that the right to counsel meant the right to the effective assistance of counsel
in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
453. Such remedies could take the form of an injunction against the trial judge, prohibiting the
assignment of additional cases to the public defender office, or a writ of mandamus ordering the trial
court to relieve the defender office by appointing private counsel to a certain number of cases. Any
injunction prohibiting the assignment of new cases could be in effect until the public defender represents
to the court that the caseload had come within the professionally recognized standards and that the office
could effectively assist new clients.
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focus exclusively on the rights of their individual clients; the time has
come for a heightened emphasis on the collective needs of indigent
defendants.
Court officials, administrators of court-appointed counsel plans, and
judges have rarely concerned themselves with the quality of counsel
provided indigent defendants. Absent some completely unforeseeable
event, the prognosis for any additional funding for defense services is
poor indeed-it is almost inconceivable that elected politicians would call
for or provide additional funding to represent indigents accused of crime.
The responsibility of defense counsel, who are most aware of the
egregious violations which result from inadequate funding, is clear.
Neither habeas corpus petitions, nor appeals based on claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, nor attempts by private court-appointed counsel to
unite and strike have been successful in bringing about the fundamental
changes that are required.
Systematic litigation attacking the constitutionality of the system for
delivering defense services, however, offers hope and promise. The
failures of states and counties to provide adequate funds to ensure the
constitutionally mandated effective assistance of counsel are subject to,
and call for, attack.
There are few jobs as vital to our Constitution as that of defense
counsel for the indigent. Every day such counsel protect and fight for the
basic constitutional rights of citizens who are being prosecuted by the
state. Now, those same counsel, or others representing the class of
indigent defendants deprived of their Sixth Amendment rights, must
initiate litigation against the government for failing in its responsibilities.
Public defenders should act as criminal justice policy makers, as litigators
actively advocating systemic change. Those who defend accused indigents
cannot be compelled to work under circumstances that render it impossible
to provide the effective assistance of counsel.
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